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Abstract
Monetary rules in an open economy with distortionary subsidies and inefficient shocks: A
DSGE approach for Bolivia
by
Valeria Jemio Hurtado
Through an estimated and calibrated DSGE model with imperfect competition and nominal
rigidities, this work aims to assess the dynamic effects of exogenous perturbations in a small
open economy to provide a prescription of a simple monetary policy rule associated with the
minimal welfare losses in the case of Bolivia.
Following Gali and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009), I display the baseline model in
a canonical representation. Yet, unlike them, I consider the presence of efficient and inefficient
perturbations, namely government spending, productivity, foreign demand, and cost-push
shocks, to analyze its effects in terms of observable variables but also on the relevant output
gap. Moreover, considering the significance of raw materials as a proportion of the Bolivian
exports, I extend the model by taking into account a distortionary subsidy on consumption
financed by the positive profits of the commodity sector,
Further, in the style of Gali and Monacelli (2005), I compare the welfare implications under
two scenarios: A monetary rule focus on maintain a nominal exchange rate peg (fixed) regime1
and a Taylor rule. The main results reveal that the latter outperforms the former when the
full set of shocks occurs simultaneously, showing the importance of inflation targeting.
Yet, by focusing only on inefficient exogenous perturbations, and taking into account a
pegged regime and a simple Taylor rule based on consumer and producer price inflation, the
ranking of monetary policy aligns in the first place an exchange rate peg. This scenario shows
the potential success of alternative simple monetary rules under these circumstances2.
1I analyze the dynamic implications of a monetary rule focus on maintain a fixed exchange rate regime,
given that according to the IMF report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions, the Central Bank
of Bolivia focus on a "monetary policy aggregates" system, keeping a "de facto" exchange rate anchor of the
Bolivian currency to the US dollar.
2Feel free to contact the author: valeriafjh@gmail.com
ix
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The systematic application of DSGE models is not necessarily common practice in emerging
small open economies, where the understanding of the dynamic effects of exogenous pertur-
bations is imperative for an appropriate monetary policy recommendation. Specifically, the
focal point of this analysis is Bolivia, given that it provides a realistic scenario to examine the
repercussions of efficient and inefficient shocks in a small open economy.
Since 2011, this country maintained a fixed exchange rate regime pegged to the US dollar.
In the last twenty years, its exports, mainly explained by commodities, represented 24 percent
of GDP, showing a procyclical behavior and a high degree of growth volatility of the order
of 7.5 percent1. The government is the owner of commodity products, whose profits fund
distortionary subsidies on consumption. Further, government spending, financed by taxes,
played an important role, as it has been growing at an average rate of 4.2 percent over the
last two decades. On the other hand, Bolivian agriculture, which represents almost 15 percent
of GDP, is particularly vulnerable to real shocks, as the issue of natural disasters such as
floods and climatic atmospheric changes in the Amazon and Altiplano, affects unmistakably
the level of prices and generates lower levels of output2. Thence, the presence of inefficient
perturbations (cost-push shocks) and distortionary subsidies in this economy is undeniable.
In the context of the basic New Keynesian model, inflation and relevant output gap stability
are simultaneously achieved only when cost-push shocks are not present. Otherwise, the
monetary authority faces a dilemma and targeting inflation conveys an inefficient level of
economic activity. Hence, to close the relevant output gap, a flexible inflation targeting would
be preferable, however, that complicates the welfare-maximizing strategy, even in the context
of an optimal monetary policy. Thus, according to Shuterland (2004) [43] in view of such
difficulties, the most practical strategy would be the application of non-optimal but simple
monetary policy rules and follow the one that maximizes the gains for society.
Thence, this work portrays a model to understand the dynamic effects and welfare impli-
cations of efficient and inefficient shocks in the context of a small open economy under the
presence of distortionary subsidies. After understanding its implications, I evaluate alternative
simple monetary policy rules, in order to select the one associated with the minimal welfare
losses.
Unlike in the literature before, the baseline model of this analysis provides a canonical
representation based not only on productivity and foreign demand exogenous perturbations
as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) but also on government spending and cost-push shocks.
Thanks to this representation, it is feasible to analyze its welfare effects by focussing not
1Author computations based on Bolivian national accounts. Check table 2.1 for further details.
2Social conflicts, such as strikes and roadblocks also affects positively the level of prices, since the
transportation of products faces difficulties.
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only on observable macroeconomic variables but also on the output gap and the theoretical
efficient level of output. Further, the extended model centers on the everlasting paradigm of
emerging commodity-dependent countries. To represent this issue, I introduce a time-varying
distortionary subsidy on consumption financed by the profits of the commodity sector, to
illustrate a channel of transmission towards the representative agent. Thence introducing
this additional perturbation, it is possible to complete the picture of the analysis of a typical
developing country such as Bolivia.
In the case of the baseline model, I compare a Taylor rule with four different combinations
of weights on the output gap and inflation, and an exchange rate peg. The results show
that in terms of the minimal welfare losses and the joint presence of efficient and inefficient
shocks, a pegged regime is situated always in the last place, in line with Gali and Monacelli
(2005) [27]. Yet, when I concentrate only on inefficient exogenous perturbations, the ranking of
monetary policy rules aligns in the first place an exchange rate peg. This scenario sheds light
on the Central Bank‘s dilemma arising as a result of cost-push shocks, showing the typical
ineffectiveness of inflation targeting under this case, and the potential success of alternative
simple monetary rules under these circumstances.
As mentioned before, the analysis of the Bolivian economy would not be complete without
taking into account the commodity sector as it introduces additional distortions in this economy.
In this context, by comparing a Taylor rule and an exchange rate peg regime I find that in
the joint presence of efficient and inefficient exogenous perturbations, the preferred policy rule
is the former over the latter, as in the baseline case. The same result holds when commodity
price shocks are evaluated individually.
The model provides many other insights relevant to the analysis. In particular, each
exogenous perturbation elicits a different set of dynamics. First, government spending based
on the purchase of domestic goods leads to an upsurge of the efficient level of output, producing
downward pressures on private consumption given the negative wealth effect. Second, cost-
push shocks lead to a deeper slowdown in production under a Taylor rule given the emerging
dilemma between inflation and output gap stabilization. Third, under both regimes, a
technological shock triggers an expansion of the efficient output as a result of the lift in the
capacity of production. Fourth, external demand for home goods generates a contemporaneous
expansion on the efficient output, along with considerable deviations of the relevant gap under
a peg, and upward pressures on domestic consumption given the switching effect. And fifth,
commodity price shocks lead to downward pressures on the real exchange rate and terms of
trade, generating a hike in consumption for foreign goods.
To perform the analysis, I did a Bayesian estimation of those parameters for which there
is only a prior belief about their value. For that purpose, I used quarterly data from Bolivia
along the periods between 2009 to 2019.
Besides, I analyze an additional simple monetary policy rule that reflects the commitment
to maintain a managed exchange rate but also targets inflation as in Monacelli (2004) [39].
The welfare evaluation under this policy shows that it outperforms a pure pegged regime but
underperforms a Taylor rule.
Concerning the theoretical construction of the model, the main structure follows the
seminar paper of Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27], by taking into account imperfect competition,
staggered prices à la Calvo (1983) [13] and the dynamics of interaction between the small
open economy and the rest of the world. Further, unlike their representation of the world as a
continuum of economies, I consider the analysis of De Paoli (2009) [21] in which the limit of
the size of the domestic country tends to zero, such that it does not influence the performance
of the rest of the world, but it is attained by external demand fluctuations. Yet, as stated
2
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above, I extend their models by incorporating a canonical representation including together
efficient and inefficient shocks.
The typical issue of assessing the dynamic impacts of government spending in an open
economy context is explored by Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) [33]. In their style, I incorporate
public purchases of domestic goods. Moreover, the importance of considering cost-push shocks
in this framework is highlighted by Adolfson et al (2007) [1]. They develop a DSGE model
including several frictions and describing the dynamics of multiple exogenous perturbations in
a small open economy. Unlike Lubik et al (2006) and Adolfson et al (2007), I also focus on
the welfare implications of government spending and cost-push shocks.
To incorporate a commodity sector in the model, I take into account the analyses of Medina
(2005) [36] and Ferrero (2017) [24]. Although, unlike both of them, I consider that the profits
generated in the commodity sector finance a distortionary subsidy on consumption, as it is the
case in Bolivia. The first author includes oil in the consumption basket, and the second one
represents the production function of the commodity sector by displaying decreasing returns
to scale.
Bolivia and the DSGE literature: One of the most important analysis through the
lens of a DSGE model for this country, is the paper of Cerezo (2010) [15]. The author presents
the effects of productivity and external demand shocks and finds that a monetary policy
targeting only inflation is less successful than a Taylor-type rule that takes into account output
and inflation simultaneously.
Valdivia et al (2017) [47] perform a Bayesian estimation to evaluate the dynamic effects of
public investment and cost-push shocks. However, their analysis is based on the context of a
closed economy model.
Concerning previous efforts in understanding the effects of the commodity sector in Bolivia,
Valdivia (2016) [46] assumes that government spending is financed by the profits of the
natural gas sales. Finally, the more recent contribution is the one of Zeballos et al (2018) [46]
that estimates a Markov-Switching DSGE model in the context of a small open economy,
considering monetary policy, preference, productivity, and external demand shocks. They
take into account a "monetary aggregate targeting" regime but do not represent the "de facto"
exchange rate anchor to the US dollar holding in this nation.
The description of the recent strand of DSGE literature for this country, among others3,
provides the base for the calibration of the model presented here. Therefore, I focus on the
Bayesian estimation of those parameters for which there is only a prior belief about their value.
Further, I contribute to the Bolivian literature, by analyzing the welfare implications and the
dynamic effects of efficient and inefficient shocks in an open economy context by comparing
alternative monetary policies and taking into account a fixed exchange rate regime.
This work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a brief description of the context of
analysis. Chapter 3 sets up the theoretical model and its canonical representation considering
the effect of four kinds of exogenous perturbations in a small open economy: external demand,
government spending, productivity, and cost-push shocks. In the first section of chapter 4, I
display the simulation of the model based on both, estimated and calibrated parameters. The
second section of chapter 4 exhibits the welfare analysis and the comparison and evaluation of
alternative simple monetary rules. Chapter 5 presents a concise extension of the model for the
analysis of commodity price shocks. Finally, chapter 6 concludes. The appendixes show the
mathematical derivations and the relevant graphs linked to this work.
3See also Garron (2016) [22] Machicado (2012) [34] and Salas (2018) [42]
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Chapter 2
Context of analysis
According to the International Monetary Fund [10], Bolivia registered annual real GDP
growth of 4.8 percent on average in the last ten years, and built up sizable foreign reserves.
However, since the commodity price drop in 2014, authorities have focused on the expansion
of public spending in order to strengthen further economic growth. This approach led to large
fiscal and external current account deficits and a sharp increase in public debt.
Figure 2.1: Twin deficits and competitiveness
Panel (a) of figure 2.1 shows the behavior of the twin deficits over the last ten years. The
fiscal deficit reached its most critical performance in 2018 at a level of 8 percent of GDP.
There was also a persistent negative current account balance of -3 percent on average since
2015. As the theory suggest, these facts implies that the country is a net debtor to the rest of
the world, which means capital inflows triggering an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
This is known as the transfer problem, as there are upward pressures on the demand for home
tradable and nontradable goods, leading to higher relative domestic prices and finally a terms
of trade worsening [17].
In this regard, Panel (b) of figure 2.1 shows the terms of trade improvement and the real
exchange rate appreciation. This makes Bolivian exports less competitive in comparison to
their foreign counterparts. Although, according to Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27], in the case
of a pegged regime there is an excess smoothing of the terms of trade, which suggests that the
real appreciation of the domestic currency could have been even deeper1.
As it is shown in panel (a) of figure two, despite the negative performance of the current
account, the Bolivian economy grew up on average 1.2 percent more than their foreign
counterparts in the last ten years. Concerning annual inflation, the country registered on
average, a rate of 4.2 percent in the same period, substantially lower than other economies
1In this regard check IMF/Combes et al (2011) [17]
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such as Venezuela (annual inflation above 1000 percent), but greater than Chile and Peru
(average annual inflation below 3 percent).
Figure 2.2: GDP growth in Bolivia and south America, CPI inflation and composition of
foreign exports
Table 1.1 summarizes the key business cycle moments for Bolivia since 1990. I report
mean, standard deviation, persistence, and contemporaneous correlation across variables. As
it is shown, a number of properties of this economy are in line with the traditionally observed
properties in business cycles: consumption and government spending, are procyclical variables,
and investment is the most volatile one.
Table 2.1: Business cycles moments 1990-2019, In terms of Growth rates
Y C I G X M IND COM CP
Mean 4.09 3.81 6.86 4.18 4.66 5.32 4.04 3.56 4.09
S.D 1.43 1.2 12.42 1.91 7.62 8.59 1.85 2.96 15.42
Persistence 0.351 0.351 0.115 0.619 0.055 0.178 0.168 0.133 0.083
Corr with Y 1 0.72 0.61 0.46 0.23 0.51 0.51 0.59 0.06
Corr with C 0.72 1 0.64 0.59 -0.23 0.38 0.17 0.19 -0.14
Corr with I 0.61 0.64 1 0.27 -0.08 0.76 -0.05 0.13 0.04
Corr with G 0.46 0.59 0.27 1 -0.10 0.14 0.22 0.10 -0.23
Corr with X 0.23 -0.23 -0.08 -0.10 1 0.45 0.12 0.39 0.53
Corr with M 0.51 0.38 0.76 0.14 0.45 1 -0.23 0.27 0.32
Corr with IND 0.51 0.17 -0.05 0.22 0.12 -0.23 1 0.28 0.02
Corr with COM 0.59 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.39 0.27 0.28 1 0.47
Corr with CP 0.06 -0.14 0.04 -0.23 0.53 0.32 0.02 0.47 1
Note: Y=Output, C=Consumption, I=Investment, G=Government Spending, X=Exports,
M= Imports, IND=Industrial sector, COM=Commodity sector, CP=Global commodity price
Index IMF (2003=100). Own elaboration based on Bolivian national accounts and IMF.
Persistence is the coefficient from an estimated AR(1) process. Annual frequency, real and per
capita terms.
Interestingly, government spending presents the highest level of annual persistence along
the last twenty years, and its average growth surpasses the one of the output, highlighting its
importance on the overall economic performance.
Also, there is a high correlation between the growth rate of imports and output, suggesting
the relevance in the consumption of foreign goods in this country.
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Finally, on the supply side, I take into account only two sectors of the Bolivian economy:
the commodity and the industrial one. The former represents around 60 percent of the total
tradable output, is highly procyclical, and is explained mainly by agriculture, natural gas,
and metals. This fact suggests two ideas: First, the importance of the commodity sector,
given that according to panel B of figure 2.2, exports of raw materials represent on average
32 percent of the total. And second, the relevance of agriculture that is subject to potential
real shocks, given the frequency of natural disasters related to floods, storms, and dramatic
atmospheric changes in the Altiplano and Amazon2.
Not surprisingly, there is a positive correlation between the commodity sector and exports.
There is also a strong relationship between exports and the world commodity price index
published by the International Monetary Fund.
2Also, it is important to consider that in Bolivia, social conflicts, strikes and roadblocks also exert upward
pressures in the level of prices of agricultural products.
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Chapter 3
The model
Following in large part Gali & Monacelli (2005) [27], the main features of this model
consist of imperfect competition and staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983) [13]1. Unlike
their representation of the world as a continuum of economies, I consider the analysis of De
Paoli (2009) [21] in which the limit of the size of the domestic country tends to zero, such
that it does not influence at all the performance of the rest of the world, but is attained
by external demand fluctuations. There are two types of exogenous perturbations: demand
shocks emerging from the external and public consumption of domestic goods, and supply
shocks arising from productivity and cost-push shocks. In this way, I consider efficient and
inefficient shocks and represent a canonical representation of the model.
There is a continuum of identical infinite-lived households of unit mass populating the
world. The segment [0,n) lives in the home country H, and the remaining (n,1] belongs to the
rest of the world or the foreign country F. Each household owns a competitive-monopolistic
firm producing a differentiated good, and each one of them employs only labor for production,
assuming constant returns to scale. In the same way, agents produce a continuum of goods
indexed on the intervals [0, n) and [n, 1], respectively.
Home and foreign goods are tradable, and the law of one price holds for all of them, such
that the only reason for deviations from purchasing power arises as a result of home bias in
consumption. Further, the international financial market is complete.
3.1 Preferences
The representative household in country H maximizes her inter-temporal separable utility
function defined over consumption C and hours worked N , which is continuously differentiable
in both arguments, increasing and concave in C, and decreasing and convex in N :
Ut = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (3.1)
Therefore, the agent obtains utility from a consumption bundle and contributes to the
production of goods, attaining disutilty from labor. β ǫ [0, 1] is the inter-temporal discount
factor of preferences and E0 is the expectation conditional on the information at time 0.
Consumption and labor are respectively represented by iso-elastic functional forms:
U(C,N) =
C1−ρ − 1
1− ρ
−
N1+η
1 + η
1See also: De Paoli (2008) [20], Bertholt (2012) [9], Benigno(2009) [7] and Corsetti et al (2005) [18]
7
CHAPTER 3. THE MODEL
where the parameter ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and η is the inverse of
the elasticity of labor supply. Each monopolistic competitive firm produces a differentiated
consumption good h, using labor as the only input and employing the production function
yt(h) = AtNt(h), where At is the aggregate technology.
Consumption C is a composite index of home CH and foreign CF goods, defined by the
following constant elasticity of substitution function:
C =
(
v
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F
) θ
θ−1
(3.2)
θ > 0 denotes the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign-produced
goods. As in De Paoli (2009), the parameter determining home consumers’ preferences for
foreign goods, (1− v), is a function of the relative size of the foreign economy (1− n) and the
domestic degree of openness “λ”, namely:
(1− v) = (1− n)λ (3.3)
hence, home bias is inversely related to the degree of openness of the domestic economy. Similar
preferences yield for the rest of the world, where C∗H and C
∗
F denote the foreign consumption
of home and foreign products respectively:
C∗s =
(
v∗
1
θC
∗
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v
∗)
1
θC
∗
θ−1
θ
F
) θ
θ−1
(3.4)
where the foreign consumers’ preferences for home goods v∗ depend on the relative size of the
home economy n and its degree of openness λ:
v∗ = nλ (3.5)
CH and C
∗
H are indexes of home and foreign consumption of differentiated goods produced
in-country H, represented by the following constant elasticity of substitution function:
CH =
((
1
n
) 1
σt
∫ n
0
c(h)
σt−1
σt dh
) σt
σt−1
(3.6)
C∗H =
((
1
n
) 1
σt
∫ n
0
c∗(h)
σt−1
σt dh
) σt
σ−1
(3.7)
σt denotes a time varying elasticity of substitution across the differentiated goods h within
a country. In the same way, the consumption indexes of differentiated goods elaborated in
country F are:
CF =
((
1
1− n
) 1
σt
∫ 1
(1−n)
c(f)
σt−1
σt df
) σt
σt−1
(3.8)
C∗F =
((
1
1− n
) 1
σt
∫ 1
(1−n)
c∗(f)
σt−1
σt df
) σt
σt−1
(3.9)
Consumption-based price indexes represent a composition of prices of domestic and foreign
goods since the representative household consumes both of them:
P = (vP 1−θH + (1− v)P
1−θ
F )
1
1−θ (3.10)
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P ∗ = (v∗P ∗1−θH + (1− v
∗)P ∗1−θF )
1
1−θ (3.11)
The price sub-indexes for domestic goods consumed in countries H and F are respectively:
PH =
((
1
n
) ∫ n
0
p(h)1−σtdh
) 1
1−σt
(3.12)
P ∗H =
((
1
n
) ∫ n
0
p∗(h)1−σtdh
) 1
1−σt
(3.13)
where p∗(h) is the price of a generic differentiated good h produced in country H and consumed
in country F. In the same fashion, the price sub-indexes of foreign- produced goods are the
following:
PF =
((
1
1− n
) ∫ 1
(1−n)
p(f)1−σtdf
) 1
1−σt
(3.14)
P ∗F =
((
1
1− n
) ∫ 1
(1−n)
p∗(f)1−σtdf
) 1
1−σt
(3.15)
Not less important, P and P ∗ are expressed in units of domestic and foreign currency
respectively. The real exchange rate Q˜ is the following:
P 6= SP ∗ −→ Q˜ =
SP ∗
P
(3.16)
where S is the Nominal exchange rate. On the other hand, the law of one price holds for
identical goods produced in country H but traded at separate markets H and F:
p(h) = Sp∗(h) and p(f) = Sp∗(f) (3.17)
3.1.1 Intratemporal consumption choice
The optimal domestic allocation of home and foreign goods is the following2:
CH = v
(
PH
P
)−θ
C (3.18)
CF = (1− v)
(
PF
P
)−θ
C (3.19)
where the demand function for a home-produced good depends on its relative price, the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution, and is weighted by the home bias. Similarly, the
optimal allocation of foreign agents in terms of domestic prices is:
C∗H = v
∗
(
PH
PQ˜
)
−θ
C∗ (3.20)
C∗F = (1− v
∗)
(
PF
PQ˜
)
−θ
C∗ (3.21)
2Derivations available in appendix A.1
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Agents of the domestic country maximize their consumption of differentiated goods, thus
the demands functions for generic goods h and f are respectively:
c(h) =
1
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σt
CH (3.22)
c(f) =
1
1− n
(
p(f)
PF
)
−σt
CF (3.23)
Analogously, the foreign demand for a generic good h and f in terms of domestic prices is
the following:
c∗(h) =
1
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σt
C∗H (3.24)
c∗(f) =
1
1− n
(
p(f)
PF
)
−σt
C∗F (3.25)
According to De Paoli (2009) [21], a country-specific level of domestic (foreign) public
expenditure is allocated only among the home (foreign) goods, describing the following
demands3:
g(h) =
1
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σt
G (3.26)
g∗(f) =
1
1− n
(
p(f)
PF
)
−σt
G∗ (3.27)
In this way, the government budget constraint in the home and foreign country are
respectively:
− τWtNt = PH,t(Gt − Trt) (3.28)
where proportional subsidies on labor τ , and exogenous fluctuations in government spending
Gt are financed by lump-sum transfers Trt given in the form of domestic goods.
• Aggregating the intratemporal demand
Applying the definition of home bias and taking into account the limit when the size of the
domestic economy tends to zero (n→ 0), the total demand for a generic good produced in
the country H and F are respectively4:
y(h) =
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σt

(PH
P
)−θ (1− λ)C + λC∗
(
1
Q˜
)
−θ

+G

 (3.29)
y(f) =
(
p∗(f)
P ∗F
)
−σt
((
P ∗F
P ∗
)−θ
C∗ +G
)
(3.30)
Hence, external changes in consumption and real exchange rate alter the aggregate demand
of the small open economy. But, domestic consumption does not influence international
demand, as the size of the home country tends to zero.
3Derivations available in appendix A.2
4Derivations available in appendix A.3
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Finally, aggregating and loglinearizing around the zero inflation steady state5, the aggregate
demands of the home and foreign country are:
yt = (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + γqt + gt (3.31)
y∗t = c
∗
t + g
∗
t (3.32)
where the public demand for differentiated home goods follows an autoregressive process with
white noise: ǫg ∼ iid N(0, σg):
gt = ρggt−1 + ǫg,t (3.33)
To allow potential external shocks in the small open economy, the domestic demand for foreign
goods follows an autoregressive process with white noise: ǫc∗ ∼ iid N(0, σc∗):
c∗t = ρc∗c
∗
t−1 + ǫc∗,t (3.34)
3.1.2 Intertemporal consumption choice
The intertemporal budget constraint of the household is the following:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (ps,t + dt)Zt−1 + (1 + τ)WtNt − PtTrt ≥ Bt + pz,tZt + PtCt
where Bt−1 is the stock of nominal bonds denominated in domestic currency, which pays a
nominal interest rate. Zt−1 are the shares of an asset which has price pz,t and pays dividend dt.
Moreover, PtTrt denotes lump-sum taxes made in the form of domestic goods and (1 + τ) is a
subsidy on labor. WtNt is labor income, where Wt is the home nominal wage and Nt is the
amount of time spending in working. Also, the representative agent consumes both domestic
and foreign goods, such that PtCt = PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t. Setting the Lagrangian and deriving
the first-order conditions6, the Euler equation is the following:
β(1 + it)Et
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
)
= 1 (3.35)
Here, the stochastic discount factor Qt,t+1, that governs the rate at which the consumer is
willing to intertemporaly substitute consumption is defined by:
Qt,t+1 = βEt
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
)
(3.36)
The labor optimality condition is:
Nηt
C−ρt
=
Wt(1 + τ)
Pt
(3.37)
Finally, the loglinearized equations are given by:
ct = Et+1(ct+1)−
1
ρ
(it − Etπt+1 − b) (3.38)
ηnt + ρct − v = wt − pt (3.39)
Where b = −ln(β), v = ln(1 + τ) and πt+1 = pt+1 − pt is the home consumer price index
inflation.
5Derivations in appendix A.3 and A.3
6Derivations available in appendix A.4
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3.2 Firms
There is a unit mass of competitive monopolistic firms, such that those on the interval
[0, n) are established in the Home country, while those on the interval (n, 1] are located in the
Foreign economy. Firms use only a homogeneous type of labor for production, whose market
is competitive and there is no investment. Each domestic firm produces a differentiated good
h, and the production function, as stated before, is the following:
yt(h) = Nt(h)At (3.40)
Labor N(h) describes constant returns to scale and At is productivity. Hence, at the aggregate
level, the loglinearized production function (around the zero inflation steady state, and up to
a first order approximation) is described by:
yt = at + nt (3.41)
All domestic firms operate with the same technology, that faces an AR(1) process with
Gaussian shocks ǫa,t ∼ iid N(0, σa):
at = ρaat−1 + ǫa,t
3.2.1 Cost minimization
Intermediate home producers face a common nominal wage. By minimizing the total
variable cost, the nominal marginal cost of producing one additional unit of the generic good
h (which is common across firms) is7:
MCn =
Wt
At
=
Wt
MPL
(3.42)
whereMPL is a decreasing function of the marginal cost and denotes the marginal productivity
of labor. Finally, the loglinearized equation of the real marginal cost in terms of domestic
prices is the following:
mcrt = wt − pH,t − at (3.43)
3.2.2 Price setting mechanism
In line with Gali and Monacelli (2005), the representative monopolistic competitive firm
knows the form of their demand functions derived previously, and follows a partial adjustment
rule à la Calvo (1983) for the price setting. In each period, a fraction α ǫ [0, 1] of randomly
chosen producers do not change the nominal price of the goods they produce8, but the
remaining proportion of firms (1 − α) selects prices optimally, independently of the time
elapsed since its last price modification.
A firm that does not re-optimize its prices will choose p˜t(h) that maximizes the present value
of its future stream of profits discounted by the stochastic discount factor Qt,t+k. Therefore,
the representative firm deals with the following problem:
maximize
p˜t(h)
∞∑
t=0
αkEt(Qt,t+k
((
yt+k(h)(p˜t(h)−MC
n
t+k)
))
subject to y˜t+k(h) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)
−σt
Yt+k
7Derivations are available in appendix A.5
8There are potential adjustment costs associated with resetting prices, such as the menu costs.
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where MCnt+k corresponds to the future stream of nominal marginal cost, Yt+k is the sequence
of demand constraints in period t+ k. Appendix A.6 shows the derivations that finally end
up in the New Keynessian Philips curve for the home country:
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζm˜c
r
t (3.44)
with ζ = (1−αβ)(1−α)
α
. Further, the definition of the marginal cost when the only distortions of
the economy are monopolistic competition and sticky prices (nominal rigidities) is defined as:
mˆcrt = mc
r
t − (−µ), where −µ is equal to the constant markup of firms. This distortion leads
to prices higher than those in perfect competition, and therefore an inefficient level of output
(if no subsidy is in place)9. However, a subsidy that perfectly offset the markup triggers an
increase in production, leading to an efficient level of output, which coincides with its natural
level (i.e. no cost-push shocks are present)10.
This model considers a time-varying markup given by µnt =
σt
σt−1
. In this way, the
representative firm takes into account the following marginal cost:
m˜crt = mc
r
t + µ
n
t (3.45)
Thus, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is written as:
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζ(mc
r
t + µ
n
t ) = βπH,t+1 + ζ(mc
r
t + µ+ µ
n
t − µ)
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζ(mˆct
r) + ζ(µnt − µ)
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζ(mˆct
r) + ζ(µt) (3.46)
Finally, the term µt = µ
n
t − µ essentially captures the deviations of the efficient output
from the natural output11, and follows an autoregressive AR(1) process with Gaussian shocks
ǫµ,t ∼ iid N(0, σµ):
µt = ρµµt−1 + ǫµ,t (3.47)
3.3 Interaction between the small open economy and
the rest of the world
3.3.1 Terms of trade and inflation
The home country’s terms of trade12 is the relative price of imported goods in terms of
the domestic goods. An improvement or a decrease in this relationship represents a more
competitive domestic country with respect to its counterpart:
TOTt =
PF,t
PH,t
→ tott = pF,t − pH,t (3.48)
After some straightforward computations13, and loglinearizing around the zero inflation
steady state, the following relationship holds:
πt = πH,t + (1− v)∆tott (3.49)
9Efficient level of output = Output under flexible prices and constant markup offset by a subsidy.
10Natural level of output = output under flexible prices, but do not rule out the presence of time varying
markups
11µ=markup that can be offset by a constant subsidy; µnt =Time varying markup
12This section is mainly based on Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27], unless otherwise specified.
13Derivations are available in Appendix A.7
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Thus, the gap between consumer and domestic inflation is given by terms of trade weighted
by the share of preferences of foreign goods. For instance, a terms of trade appreciation,
enlarge the gap between consumer and domestic inflation, as agents would prefer relatively
cheaper foreign goods.
3.3.2 Terms of trade and exchange rate
• Terms of trade and nominal exchange rate
As stated in section 3.1, the law of one price holds only for generic goods produced in a specific
country, namely:
pt(h) = Stp
∗
t (h) and pt(f) = Stp
∗
t (f)
Plugging the above expression in the definition of foreign prices 3.14, holds:
PF,t = StP
∗
F,t (3.50)
Recalling the definition of the Foreign price index in equation 3.11, the weight of home goods
in the foreign preferences (v∗ = nλ) and the fact that the size of the home country tends to
zero, the following expression yields:
P ∗ = (v∗P ∗1−θH + (1− v
∗)P ∗1−θF )
1
1−θ = P ∗F (3.51)
thus, the small open economy do not influence international prices. Plugging 3.51 in equation
3.50, and loglinearizing:
pF,t = st + p
∗
t (3.52)
Finally, combining 3.52 with the definition of terms of trade 3.48, one can observe the positive
relationship between a nominal depreciation and a terms of trade worsening14:
tott = st − pH,t + p
∗
t
In terms of first differences:
∆tott = ∆st − πH,t + π
∗
t (3.53)
A nominal depreciation means that home products are relatively cheaper than foreign ones.
That determines that per each unit of domestic products, the home country can purchase a
lower proportion of foreign goods.
• Terms of trade and real exchange rate
The real exchange is defined as follows:
Qt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
→ qt = st + p
∗
t − pt (3.54)
where the real and nominal exchange rate shows a positive correlation. Also, an increase
in the world price triggers a depreciation of the real exchange rate since the domestic goods
would be comparatively cheaper than its counterparts in the rest of the world. After some
computations shown in appendix A.8, the following relationships hold15:
qt = vtott (3.55)
qt = (1− λ)tott (3.56)
Where it is clear the positive co-movement between terms of trade and real exchange rate.
14A terms of trade worsening means an increase in the terms of trade.
15Following Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27]
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3.3.3 Uncovered interest Parity
Under complete markets households can invest in home and foreign bonds, thus the budget
constraint can be written as:
(1 + τ)WtNt − PtTrt +Πt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (1+ i
∗
t−1
)St−1B
∗
t−1
+ (pz,t + dt)Zt−1
= Bt + pz,tZt + PtCt + StB
∗
t
After obtain the optimality conditions and loglinearizing16, the following relationship holds:
it − i
∗
t = Et(∆st+1) (3.57)
When home nominal interest rates are higher than its foreign counterpart, there is an appre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate at time t, since there are capital inflows as returns on
domestic investments are higher. In the opposite case, when it<i
∗
t , there are capital outflows
that triggers a nominal depreciation at t.
Although the uncovered interest parity condition is not an additional independent equilib-
rium condition, it is meaningful to have an insight into the reasons behind potential variations
in nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
3.3.4 International Risk Sharing
Under the assumption of complete markets17, a first-order condition analogous to the Euler
equation must also hold for the representative household in any other country. After some
computations18 and the assumption of symmetric initial conditions, which means zero net
foreign asset holding, the following relationship arises:
ct = c
∗
t +
1
ρ
qt (3.58)
Using equation 3.55, which corresponds to the relationship between terms of trade and real
exchange rate, the international risk sharing can be written as:
ct = c
∗
t +
v
ρ
tott (3.59)
Therefore, under perfect asset diversification, there is a perfect consumption correlation
across countries. However, home bias allows for a gap between the home and foreign households’
consumption, even if the international financial market structure is complete. When the size
of the economy tends to zero19, the influence of the terms of trade depends on the degree of
openness of the economy. The less open the economy, the lower the consumption correlation
between the home and foreign country, and the higher the effect of terms of trade on domestic
consumption.
Finally, another representation of the risk sharing derived in equation 3.59 when the size of
the home economy tends to zero n→ 0, and using the definition of home bias ((1−v) = (1−n)λ)
yields as:
ct = c
∗
t +
(1− λ)
ρ
tott (3.60)
16Derivations are available in appendix A.9
17Following De Paoli (2009) [21] and Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27]
18Derivations are available in appendix A.10
19Recall that (1− v) = (1− n)λ)
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3.4 Equilibrium - Demand side
Following De Paoli (2009) [21], the aggregate demand, loglinearized around the symmetric,
zero inflation steady state, is the following:
yt = (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + γq + gt (3.61)
where γ = θλ(2−λ)
(1−λ)
using equation 3.55, the aggregate demand can be written as:
yt = (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + vγtott + gt (3.62)
Hence, the home aggregate output relies on the home (private and public) and foreign
aggregate consumption. The impact of deterioration or amelioration of the terms of trade
depends on the degree of openness of the small open economy as the home bias is defined
as (1 − v) = (1 − n)λ. In addition, an improvement in tott would trigger a decrease in the
demand for domestic goods since foreign ones are cheaper.
The total demand for foreign-produced goods is the following:
y∗t = c
∗
t + g
∗
t (3.63)
which depends only on the international private and public consumption of foreign goods. The
domestic demand for foreign goods is negligible as the size of the home economy tends to zero
(n→ 0).
Using the risk sharing conditions, and after some computations20 yields:
yt = y
∗
t − g
∗
t +
tott
ρv
+ gt (3.64)
where ρv =
ρ
(1− λ)γρ+ (1− λ)2
and γ =
θλ(2− λ)
(1− λ)
Thus, the impact of the terms of trade on the aggregate domestic demand depends strictly
on the parameters, namely: the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption ρ, the
degree of openness λ, the home bias v and the elasticity of intratemporal substitution θ.
3.4.1 The Euler equation in terms of output
The Euler equation in terms of output is written as:21:
yt − gt = yt+1 − gt+1 −
1
ρv
(it − πt+1,H − γ) + ωρ(c
∗
t+1 − c
∗
t ) (3.65)
where openness increases the sensitivity of aggregate demand for home goods to the interest
rate given the parameter ρv
22. Variations in the interest rates generate an expenditure
switching effect on foreign goods. That is because a rise in the domestic nominal interest rate
triggers a fall in domestic consumption greater than in the closed economy case since agents
can switch consumption towards foreign goods.
20Derivations available in appendix A.11
21Derivations in appendix A.16
22Recall that ρv =
ρ
(1−λ)γρ+(1−λ)2 and γ =
θλ(2−λ)
(1−λ)
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Further, according to the uncovered interest parity condition, an increase in domestic
nominal interest rates produces an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate (capital inflows).
That triggers an improvement of the terms of trade, since foreign goods are relatively cheaper,
lowering domestic output. The effect of foreign consumption depends on the combination of
different parameters, such as the degree of openness, intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity
of substitution contained in ωρ
23.
3.4.2 The dynamic IS equation
To derive the dynamic version of the IS equation is essential to consider the definition of
the real interest rate rt according to the Fisher rule:
rt = it − Et(πt+1) (3.66)
After some computations and expressing output in terms of deviations from its efficient
level (xt = yt − y
e
t )
24 the dynamic IS equation for the Small open economy is the following:
xt = xt+1 −
1
ρv
(it − Et(πH,t+1)− r
e
t ) (3.67)
The main difference of this equation with its closed economy counterpart, is that the degree
of openness impacts the sensitivity of the efficient output gap to variations on the interest rate.
This causes an expenditure switching effect, as stated previously. Also, it relates deviations of
the real interest rate (rt ≈ it − Et(πH,t+1)) from its efficient level r
e.
Hence, when the real interest rate is below the efficient one, there are positive deviations
of output from its efficient level. Further, expected domestic inflation triggers incentives to
produce more, and increments in the nominal interest rates exert downward pressures on the
current aggregate demand, by intertemporal substitution of consumption.
3.5 Equilibrium - Supply side
3.5.1 The marginal cost
Taking into account the labor optimality condition and the international risk sharing, the
real marginal cost is the following25:
mct = −v + ρc
∗
t + tott + ηyt − at(η + 1) (3.68)
Equation 3.68 is important to understand the sources of inflationary pressures. First, a
rise in output push up the home aggregate labor demand increasing the home real wage and
real marginal cost. The size of this effect is captured by the parameter η, which is the inverse
of the elasticity of labor supply.
The effect of foreign consumption in the marginal cost is positive. That is because a hike
on domestic production leads to an increase in the demand for labor, rising marginal costs,
and thus generating inflation coming from those firms allowed to reset its prices.
23ωρ = (
ωρv−λρ
ρv(1−λ)
)
24Derivations in appendix A.16
25Derivations in appendix A.12
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In addition, a deterioration of the terms of trade makes domestic goods comparatively
cheaper, indirectly triggering an increase in its demand, and thus marginal costs. Not less
important, the marginal cost is inversely proportional to first, productivity as employers
demand fewer workers to achieve the same output, and second, the labor subsidy as it
promotes an expansion on labor, lowering the cost per worker effectively paid by the firm.
3.5.2 The natural output
By definition, the natural level of output prevails in the absence of nominal rigidities (i.e.
flexible prices) but considers the existence of potential markup shocks. Thus, the marginal
cost is equivalent to µnt and 3.68 is written as:
− µnt = −v + y
n
t (η + ρv) + c
∗
t (ρ− ρv)− gtρv − at(η + 1) (3.69)
Isolating the natural output, the following expression yields:
ynt = Γo + Γµµ
n
t + Γ∗c
∗
t + Γggt + Γaat (3.70)
Γo =
v
η + ρv
; Γµ = −
1
η + ρv
; Γ∗ = −
ρ− ρv
η + ρv
; Γg =
ρv
η + ρv
; Γa =
η + 1
η + ρv
Government spending affects positively the natural level of output, due to a negative
wealth effect. That is because it absorbs resources and makes the agent feel poorer by the
present discounted value of taxes used to finance this spending. So, the agent consumes less
and works more, which in turn implies a rise in the natural level of output (higher labor supply
and lower marginal cost).
The effect of foreign demand is ambiguous since depends on the degree of openness and
the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution between home and foreign
goods given by the parameter ρv. The natural output depends negatively on the markup
26, as
it potentially generates an increase in inflation at the same time than reducing output. Also,
the labor subsidy generates upward pressures in the natural output, as there is an increment
in production. Finally, a technological improvement leads to a greater capacity of production.
3.5.3 The Efficient output
The efficient output yet prevails in the absence of markup shocks and nominal rigidities.
Consequently, equation 3.68 is written in the following way:
− µ = −v + yet (η + ρv)− gtρv + c
∗
t (ρ− ρv)− at(η + 1) (3.71)
Isolating yet , the efficient output is:
yet = Γo + Γ∗c
∗
t + Γggt + Γaat (3.72)
Γo =
−µ+ v
η + ρv
; Γ∗ = −
ρ− ρv
η + ρv
; Γg =
ρv
η + ρv
; Γa =
η + 1
η + ρv
The only difference between the efficient and the natural output is that the former now
depends on the constant markup whose impact on yet is still negative, as it pushes output
below its capacity. Although in this case, the markup would be completely offset by the
subsidy, and no cost-push shocks are present.
26The markup fluctuates over time as a result of the time-varying subsidy
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3.5.4 The New-Keynessian Phillips curve
The relevant output gap is defined as a function of deviations from the efficient product:
xt = yt − y
e
t (3.73)
Thus, the real marginal cost is written as a function of xt
27, and the New Keynessian Philips
curve is the following:
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + κvxt + κvµt (3.74)
κv = ζ(η + ρv) ; ζ =
(1− αβ)(1− α)
α
; ρv =
ρ
(1− λ)γρ+ (1− λ)2
; γ =
θλ(2− λ)
(1− λ)
. Where µt captures the difference between the efficient and the natural output. First, the
open economy New Keynessian Phillips curve nests the special case of a closed economy case
when λ = 0, (i.e. zero degree of openness).
Second, the Phillips curve of the small open economy now depends on the relevant output
gap. According to this framework, targeting a zero level of domestic inflation does not close
automatically the gap between the actual output and the efficient one, given the potential
cost-push shocks. Therefore, there is no divine coincidence in this economy.
Also, the greater the degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods, the less
responsive is inflation to changes in the output gap. That is because expansion in domestic
aggregate demand triggers a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate, which makes foreign
goods relatively cheaper. Thus, if the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods is high, the real appreciation would break a further expansion of the demand and thus,
of domestic prices.
3.5.5 The efficient interest rate
ret = γ + ωρ∆c
∗
t+1 + ρvΓg∆gt+1 − atρvΓa(1− ρa) (3.75)
Intuitively, the efficient interest rate defines the level of the real rate required to keep
aggregate demand equal to its efficient level. This model portrays an economy in which
nominal rigidities and inefficient shocks are present, thus the theoretical efficient interest rate
abstracts from cost-push shocks.Derivations are available in appendix A.17
27Derivations in appendix A.15
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Chapter 4
Simulation and welfare analysis
An application of the model developed in section 3 is the simulation of the dynamic
effects of external demand, government spending, productivity, and cost-push shocks. This
chapter explores in detail its main repercussions not only on observable variables such as
output, consumption, inflation, and terms of trade but also on the efficient level of output,
and therefore the relevant output gap for the Bolivian economy. This application in the style
of a rigorous theoretical approach as in De Paoli (2009) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) is a
novelty in the analysis of this country.
4.1 Estimation and parametrization
To simulate the model, I calibrate those parameters supported by the literature based
on previous DSGE models for Bolivia and Latin-American countries. On the other hand, I
estimate those parameters for which there is only a prior belief about their value.
4.1.1 Empirical methodology
The model is estimated using a Bayesian approach. According to Mancini (2008) [35],
"Bayesian estimation is a bridge between calibration and maximum likelihood", as the former
focus on the specification of priors, and the latter is based on confronting the model with the
data. Priors are described by a density function of the form:
p(VA|A)
where A symbolizes a specific model, VA represents its parameters, and p(·) stands for a
probability density function. On the other hand, the likelihood function is given by:
L(VA|YT , A) = p(YT |VA, A)
where YT are observations until period T . Together, the prior density, the likelihood function
and the Bayes theorem, gives the posterior density as:
p(VA|YT , A) =
p(YT |VA, A)p(VA|A)
p(YT |A)
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Finally, the posterior Kernel assumes that YT conditional on the model A (marginal density
1)
is always constant, and is given by2:
p(VA|YT , A) ∝ K(VA|YT , A)
Therefore, following Mancini (2008) [35], this is the fundamental equation to rebuild the
posterior moments of the parameters of interest. I use the software dynare to find its posterior
mean.3. In this case, the vector of parameters to be estimated is:
V = [ρc∗ , σc∗ , ρa, σa, ρu, σu]
And the vector of observable variables is:
YT = [yt, ct, qt, πt, tott]
4.1.2 Data and parametrization
Table 4.1: Parametrization
Description Par. Value Source
Subjective discount factor β 0.98 Zeballos (2018) [49]
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 1 Zeballos (2018)* [49]
Inverse of labor supply elasticity η 0.5 Cerezo (2011)** [15]
Degree of openness λ 0.32 Zeballos (2018)*** [49]
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution θ 0.8 Amado (2014)† [3]
Calvo parameter α 0.39 Cerezo (2011)† † [15]
Persistence of government spending ρg 0.12 Salas (2018)† † † [42]
Shock of government spending σg 0.0056 Salas (2018) [42]
* Consistent with Medina (2007) [37] in the case of Chile.
**In line with the estimation of Duncan for emerging countries (2004) [23]
***Consistent with Garcia-Cicco (2017) [28] focused on Latin-American countries.
† Estimation for Peru, and consistent with the Brazilian case (Meneses) (2016) [38]
†† In line with Valdivia (2008) [48]
† † † Computations in line with the Bayessian estimation of Lubik (2005) [33]
To estimate the model I take into account Bolivian quarterly data from 2009 Q1 to 2019
Q4. As stated in the previous section, the observable variables are real GDP (yt), real domestic
consumption (ct), real exchange rate (qt), consumer price inflation (πt), and terms of trade
(tott). The sources of data are the Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) [14] and the National
1"Univariate" probability distribution
2The symbol ∝ is a binary mathematical operator indicating that the left value is proportional to the
right value.
3This computational package estimates the likelihood function applying 1)the Kalman Filter: According
to Hamilton (1994) [30], this is an algorithm for sequentially updating a system based on the information
available. In simple words, the Kalman filter tells how to update the knowledge of a latent variable (not directly
observable but inferred from observed variables) when new information is available. and then 2)simulates the
posterior distribution using a Monte Carlo method (Technique that use random sampling to simulate a draw
from some distribution, such as the Metropolis-Hasting)
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Institute of Statistics (INE) [40]. To proceed with the analysis, first, I deseasonalize the original
series related to real GDP and consumption using the method ARIMA X-13 from the US
Census Bureau. Appendix B shows the raw data and the corresponding deseasonalized series.
Finally, to deal with non-stationary processes, I compute first differences of the log-variables.
According to the literature based on previous DSGE analysis for Bolivia and Latin American
countries, the parameters stated in table 4.1 hold for the simulation of this model.
The subjective discount factor set at 0.98 (quarterly) follows Zeballos (2018), and implies
an annual interest rate of around 4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of consumption ρ is
1, in line with DSGE analysis for Latin American countries and emerging economies4. The
inverse of the labor supply elasticity η is set at 0.5 following Cerezo (2010) [15]. This implies
an elasticity of labor supply of 2, related to the high degree of informality typical in Latin
America and thus, with the important job turnover5.
The degree of openness λ, or the share of foreign consumption goods is calibrated at 0.32
following Zeballos (2018) [49], who computes the proportion of imported consumption goods
between 2000-2017. Also, according to Amado (2014) [3], the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution among home and foreign goods θ is set at 0.8 for the Peruvian economy, consistent
with the Brazilian case analyzed by Meneses (2018) [38].
The parameter corresponding to the degree of price rigidity α is calibrated at 0.39, implying
that firms keep their prices fixed, on average, 1.6 quarters6. Finally, the parameter regarding
the autoregressive process of government spending and the standard deviation of the stochastic
component is based on the estimation of Salas (2018) [42].
4.1.3 Priors and Posteriors distributions
The last three columns of Table 4.2 reports the mean and 90 percent confidence intervals
of the Bayesian estimation. I select priors based on evidence from previous analysis in the case
of Bolivia and Latin-American countries. Appendix C shows the plots of prior and posterior
distributions as well as the convergence diagnostic.
Table 4.2: Bayesian Estimation of Parameters
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Description Par Density Domain Mean Mean 90 percentinterval
Cost-push shock persist. ρu Beta [0, 1) 0.5 0.3218 0.1870 0.4487
S.D. of cost-push shock σu Inv.Gam [0,∞) 0.0013 0.0074 0.0057 0.0091
Ext. demand persist. ρc∗ Beta [0, 1) 0.7 0.7941 0.6666 0.9235
S.D. ext. demand shock σc∗ Inv.Gam [0,∞) 0.01 0.0286 0.0233 0.0337
Productivity persist. ρa Beta [0, 1) 0.4 0.2659 0.1392 0.3913
S.D. prod. shock σa Inv.Gam [0,∞) 0.0071 0.0140 0.0112 0.0166
The autoregressive parameters of the stochastic processes ρu, ρc∗ and ρa have beta distri-
butions because their values should lie in the [0, 1) interval7.
In particular, the mean of the prior about the persistence of cost-push shocks is set at 0.5.
For the case of Bolivia, there is only a single analysis related to these types of perturbations
4Medina (2007) [37], Meneses (2016) [38], Lahcen (2014) [31], Aguiar et al (2007) [2] among others,
5Céspedes (2012) [16]
6Recall that the average duration of the price is 11−α
7This guarantees a stationary process that does not "explode".
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(Valdivia (2017) [47]) in a closed economy context. Finally, according to the Bayesian process
performed in this section, I estimate an autoregressive coefficient of 0.3218 and a stochastic
process with a standard deviation of 0.0074.
Regarding the external demand shocks, I take into account the analysis of Cerezo (2011) [15]
who computed an autoregressive coefficient of 0.78. Thence, I set a prior belief of 0.7 and
obtain a posterior mean of 0.79. In the same way, analyses for Latin American countries
suggest values between 0.01 and 0.02 for the standard deviation of external demand shocks. I
set a value of 0.01 and estimated a posterior mean of 0.0286.
Finally, I estimate productivity shocks given the large discordance in the Bolivian literature
regarding this parameter. Concerning the persistence of the autoregressive process, Salas
(2019) [42] and Cerezo (2011) [15] estimate values around 0.3, while Zeballos (2018) [49] fixes
this parameter around 0.8. My Bayesian estimation suggests a coefficient of persistence of
0.27 and a standard deviation of 0.014.
4.1.4 Monetary policy
Until now there was missing an essential part of the analysis: The specification of the
monetary policy rule. In this context, I compare the effects of exogenous perturbations under
two different types of simple monetary policy rules: First, a typical Taylor rule9, and second a
fixed exchange rate regime. I analyze the latter rule given that according to the IMF report
on "Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions" 2019 [5], the Central Bank of Bolivia focus
on a "monetary policy aggregates" system, keeping a "de facto" exchange rate anchor of the
Bolivian currency to the US dollar.
For the Taylor rule, the weights assigned to inflation ψpi and output gap ψx are set at 1.5
and 0.5 respectively. The parameter corresponding to the interest rate smoothing ρr is 0.7:
it = ρrit−1 + ψpiπt + ψxx
On the other hand, in order to take into account the fixed exchange rate currently in place
in Bolivia, the only condition is a constant nominal exchange rate over time:
∆st = 0
Thus, I compare both policies separately in the style of Gali and Monacelli(2005) [27].
4.2 Welfare Analysis
A natural criteria to compare alternative monetary policy regimes in a microfunded model,
is the sum of the utilities of the consumers10:
W = Et
∞∑
t=0
βtwt
8The analysis of Cerezo was executed in 2011, thus it is relevant to compute this parameter with updated
information
9A typical Taylor rule generally considers a Consumer Price Inflation - CPI - targeting, as it is easily
communicated to the public. However, a recent strand of literature points out to the welfare improvements of
a Producer Price Inflation - PPI - targeting. Appendix D shows the impulse response functions under the
later policy and its welfare implications
10Benigno (2008) [7]
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where wt =
(
C1−ρ−1
1−ρ
− N
1+η
1+η
)
. Also, consumption and labor are respectively represented by
iso-elastic functional forms.
Appendix E shows that a second order approximation of W around the steady state,
assuming intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to the unity (i.e. ρ = 1), yields the
following welfare criterion:
W = −
C(1 + η)
2
var(nˆt) (4.1)
where the term C = UnN
UcC
keeps constant over time. Hence, using equation 4.1 it is possible to
assess each monetary policy rule and select the one that minimizes variations in labor from
the steady-state. But why is that the case? As this is a micro-founded model, the notion
that individuals get satisfaction from consuming goods and leisure is summarized by the
utility function, which in the end measures the agent’s level of felicity or happiness (Borjas
(2008)) [11]. In this context, the representative household maximizes consumption, since utility
is an increasing and concave11 in C and minimize labor as the function is decreasing and
convex in N . Hence, welfare losses (or "individual unhappiness") are explained by variations
in labor from the steady-state, showing the key role of this variable in the analysis.
Also, following Gali and Monacelli (2005), and assuming intratemporal and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to the unity, i.e. ρ = θ = 1, the following relationship is
derived12 from a second-order Taylor approximation:
W = −(1− λ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
2
(σζ−1π2Ht + (1 + η)xˆ
2
t )
)
(4.2)
where ζ−1 = α
(1−α)(1−βα)
. However, this representation ties the analysis to a very restrictive
case given the assumption on the parameters. Therefore the following evaluation is based on
the application of equation 4.1, but also shows the variations on inflation and output gap
associated to each simple alternative monetary policy.
According to Clarida et al (1999) [12], the foremost goal of the monetary authority is to
minimize squared deviations of the output gap and inflation from their targets to maximize
welfare. Those fluctuations arise as a result of efficient and inefficient exogenous perturbations:
When shocks are inefficient, the natural level of output does not coincide with the efficient
one, as cost-push shocks are present. In the baseline model, the leading component of those
frictions is the time-varying markup of firms. The New Keynesian Phillips curve, depicted by
equation 3.74, reveals a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization, as both of them
do not concur simultaneously. Consequently, it is clear that even if the Central Bank achieves
completely its target on inflation, it will convey an inefficient level of economic activity.
On the other hand, efficient exogenous perturbations (such as productivity, foreign demand,
and government spending shocks) do not create a dilemma between output and inflation
stabilization. This scenario indicates that the so-called divine coincidence prevails. Thus,
when the subsidy on labor is in place, the natural level of output matches the efficient one
since no cost-push shocks are present.
But why is it so important to attain output and inflation stabilization to minimize welfare
losses? In accordance with Gali (2015) [26], the former should fluctuate in line with its
efficient level13, given that real shocks (such as exogenous perturbations in the aggregate
11In this particular setting I assume intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to the unity ρ = 1 i.e.
log-utility which is a function also increasing and concave in C
12Derivations in appendix E.2
13The natural output is equivalent to the efficient one if cost-push shocks are not present and the subsidy
on labor perfectly offsets the markup of firms
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productivity) represent a source of changes on its level. Besides, deviations of output from
its target generates inflationary (deflationary) pressures as the marginal costs of firms rise
(decrease) due to the expansion (shrinkage) of aggregate demand, leading output above (below)
its capacity14. Thence, when output is at its efficient level, there is no inflation, as those firms
allowed to reset prices every period select the same price as their counterparts facing price
stickiness15. Further, price stability is desirable for many reasons including the maintenance
of the purchasing power, the anchoring of expectations, and the Central Bank‘s transparency
in communicating explicitly an inflation targeting.
The next part exhibits the implications of supply and demand shocks on the relevant
output gap defined as the difference between the actual and the efficient output. I subsequently
show the welfare implications associated with the second-order approximation of the felicity
function and the effects of exogenous perturbations under alternative monetary policy rules.
Therefore, as explained previously, it is going to be clear that deviations from the relevant
output gap and excessive fluctuations in inflation drive also welfare losses.
Note that, the simulation and welfare analysis are performed using the software Dynare.
In particular, variances corresponds to the unconditional theoretical moments of variables in
the estimated model.
4.3 Simulation
This section displays the effects of efficient and inefficient exogenous perturbations on six
variables: output, consumption, domestic inflation, efficient output, and the relevant output
gap. Appendix D shows the impulse response functions to the full set of variables. Also, I
compare the repercussions under two different scenarios: A Taylor rule and an exchange rate
peg regime.
4.3.1 Impulse responses to external demand shocks under alterna-
tive policy rules
Figure 4.1: Impulse responses to external demand shocks
14The output capacity is the natural level of output
15That is because of the intrinsic characteristic of price flexibility when the output is at its efficient level.
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First of all, an inflation-targeting rule maintains greater stabilization of prices and output
gap than an exchange rate peg regime. More precisely, under inflation targeting, a shock of 2.9
percent in external demand leads to a rise in domestic inflation of only 0.5 percent compared
to a potential increase of approximately 2 percent under an exchange rate peg. In the same
fashion, the output gap is almost two times higher in the context of the latter.
According to the equilibrium conditions, an expansion of foreign consumption of domesti-
cally produced goods generates an increase of output and hence domestic inflation coming
from those firms allowed to reset their prices. Thus, there is an improvement in the terms of
trade, triggering the expenditure switching effect, as home consumption grows since agents
can purchase more foreign goods per each unit of domestic ones. This intuition accompanies
the idea of perfect consumption correlation illustrated by the risk-sharing condition.
Not less important, 16 an expansion in foreign demand encourages domestic labor demand
and thus wages, pushing an enlargement in the marginal cost and inflation. The amplification
of production leads to a rise in the natural output which coincides with the efficient one in
the absence of cost-push shocks. Finally, given an increase in the efficient output less than
proportional than the actual hike in the level of output, there is an expansionary impact
in the efficient interest rate. However, the output gap remains positive, as the real interest
rate is below its efficient level. As a result of the greater deviations of the output gap and
inflation under a nominal exchange rate peg, there are negative welfare implications of this
policy. According to the literature 17, floating exchange rate regimes are in theory the most
effective mean to absorb external shocks. When domestic prices are sticky, a shock in foreign
demand leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. That in turns increases the
relative prices of home goods precisely the moment when the demand for them has risen, and
therefore partially offsets the effect of higher deviations of output and weakens inflation.
The same intuition holds in the context of a negative foreign demand shock, which leads to
a nominal exchange rate depreciation, making domestic goods more competitive (automatic
stabilizer). This is not the case under a fixed exchange rate regime, where a shock in the
foreign demand is translated in an expansion of inflation, limited by the price stickiness.
4.3.2 Impulse responses to government spending shocks under al-
ternative policy rules
The first element to note here is the effect of government spending on output. In this case
public spending is explained by the purchase of home differentiated goods, thus the positive
transmission of government consumption is focus on the demand side of this economy, affecting
unmistakably the output gap through the dynamics of the IS curve.
More precisely, in the context of a Taylor rule, the peak fiscal multiplier is 0.75 and
0.875 under the competing monetary policy (given an upsurge of government spending of 5.6
percent). But, concerning the cumulative fiscal multiplier, the difference between a peg regime
and a Taylor rule only arises as a result of the contemporaneous effect on output.
On the other hand, there is a sudden decrease in private consumption 18 due to a negative
wealth effect. That is because government spending absorbs resources and makes the agent feel
poorer by the present discount value of taxes that are used to finance this spending. Thence,
16Recall equation 3.68: mct = ρc
∗
t + tott + ηyt − at(η + 1)
17(Broda (2001) [12])
18This result is contrary to the data and empirical analysis (Ambler (2017)) [4]
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the representative household consumes less and works more for a given wage, which at the
same time implies an increase in output19.
Figure 4.2: Impulse responses to government spending shocks
Interestingly, in the context of a nominal exchange rate peg regime, the effect on output
is slightly higher than under an inflation targeting. This result coincides with the literature
(Corsetti (2013)) [19] and the textbook Mundell-Fleming model, which suggests that fiscal
policy is more effective under a fixed regime.
Finally, considering a nominal exchange rate peg, the terms of trade cutback is 4 percent
lower than in the inflation targeting case, given the typical smoothing effect in the context of
a fixed regime. Although, the augment of inflation is almost double under this scenario, given
the increase in domestic prices as a result of the demand expansion.
In general, a positive shock of government spending represents a transient expansion of
output, that last for less than three quarters. In contrast, the effect on consumption endures
for at least five quarters.
Even though there are apparent benefits in terms of a greater hike in output in the context
of an exchange rate peg, the volatility of inflation and the output gap implies negative welfare
effects of this policy.
4.3.3 Impulse responses to productivity shocks under alternative
policy rules
First of all, a productivity shock is tied to a reduction in the domestic interest rate,
expanding consumption and output20. Therefore, the uncovered interest parity condition
implies a nominal depreciation, leading to a terms of trade worsening which boost consumption
and output given the greater competitiveness of the domestic economy.
Under both monetary rules, there is a fall in domestic inflation, as the marginal cost of
production falls as a result of the positive shock in productivity. In the context of a pegged
regime, the impossibility of lowering the nominal exchange rate leads to a limited response in
the terms of trade, which undermine competitiveness.
In addition, upward pressures on productivity has multiple effects on the labor market:
firms rise labor demand to produce more, raising wages and allowing the recovery of inflation.
19Baxter and King (1993) [6]
20Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27]
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Also, technological improvements lead to a greater capacity of production, triggering an
expansion of the efficient output. Although there is an increase in output, it remains below its
efficient level for at least two quarters after the shock, which illustrates the time that firms
need to adapt production to the new technology.
Figure 4.3: Impulse responses to productivity shocks
Finally, variations in the efficient output are independent of the monetary policy regime in
place. This scenario illustrates the idea of the classical dichotomy.
From the welfare perspective, inflation targeting leads to a greater stabilization of the
output gap and inflation, as it is clear on the graphs.
4.3.4 Impulse responses to cost-push shocks under alternative pol-
icy rules
First of all, the upsurge of domestic inflation is independent of the monetary policy regime
in place. However, the reduction in output is 0.5 percent higher under an inflation targeting.
The reason behind is that cost-push shocks create a dilemma for the central bank, as it
is inefficient to target output gap and inflation simultaneously21. On the one hand, price
stabilization is desirable, but on the other, it generates negative variations in the output
gap since the economy produces below its capacity22. Therefore, the presence of cost-push
shocks involves that monetary policy should allow for some flexibility in prices to reach the
stabilization of the output gap. At the same time, upward pressures in prices imply a cutback
in the terms of trade given that domestic goods are relatively more expensive than their
foreign counterparts.
In terms of welfare, the analysis is not clear, as inflation targeting leads to greater deviations
of the output gap, and a pegged regime generates a considerable variability of prices. The
next section is going to explore this issue in detail.
In the context of an open economy and a flexible exchange rate regime, a cost-push shock is
the leading component of an increase in the interest rate. That supports a transitory downturn
in consumption and output. Given the constancy of the world nominal interest rates, the
uncovered interest parity implies a nominal appreciation and therefore a further contraction
in demand and output through a decrease in exports, as they are less competitive. On the
21Shuterland (2004) [43]
22Recall the Phillips curve (equation A.63): piH,t = βpiH,t+1 + κvxt + κvµt
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other hand, under an exchange rate peg regime, this is no longer the case, and the contraction
in output, and thus consumption is mitigated.
Therefore, cost-push shocks are related to upward pressures on inflation and weakness
of output. For instance, an increase in the price of inputs leads to lower production since a
proportion of firms maintains prices fixed.
Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to cost-push shocks
4.3.5 Variance Decomposition of shocks
Table 4.3: Variance Decomposition of shocks- in percent
Foreign demand Productivity Gov spending Cost-push shock
Taylor Peg Taylor Peg Taylor Peg Taylor Peg
σ y 21.65 62.88 53.68 21.26 10.84 8.10 13.83 7.76
σ tot 93.18 94.25 5.36 4.17 0.08 0.06 1.38 1.52
σ c 77.09 89.62 18.01 7.53 0.26 0.10 4.64 2.75
σ πh 40.73 80.22 31.67 14.67 0.62 0.25 26.99 4.86
σ x 22.6 63.27 30.12 24.01 0.67 0.48 46.6 12.25
σ ye 5.86 5.88 86.81 86.81 7.31 7.31 0.00 0.00
-Computations are performed in Dynare, and corresponds to the unconditional variance of
shocks from the estimated model. The variance decomposition is the contribution of each
shock explaining fluctuations in endogenous variables.
Table 4.3 shows the contribution of each shocks to the variation in output, terms of trade,
consumption, domestic inflation, output gap and the efficient output.
First, foreign demand explains a large proportion of the output variability in the context
of a pegged regime. The reason is related to the upsurge in inflation (coming from those firms
allowed to reset their prices) which enables an enlargement of production as a result of the
greater demand. Moreover, the terms of trade smoothness characteristic of this monetary
policy rule, limits a further appreciation of the real exchange rate and enhances production,
as the currency is overvalued.
On the other hand, considering a Taylor rule, a flexible exchange rate (automatic stabilizer),
limits variations in the output gap as a result of foreign demand perturbations. Thus, alterations
of output are mainly explained by productivity shocks as it is common on the literature23
23For instance the analysis of Tenreyro et al (2017) [44]
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Also note that under any competing monetary policy, the contribution of foreign demand
shocks in the variability of the terms of trade is greater than 90 percent. This shows the
influence of the external demand on domestic prices and therefore competitiveness of the
small open economy. Consequently, foreign demand is also an important source of volatility in
consumption, given the expenditure switching effect.
Finally, the contribution of government spending to fluctuations in the variables analyzed
here is negligible compared to the rest of the shocks. The reason behind is given by the low
standard deviation of the stochastic process corresponding to the exogenous process.
4.4 Evaluation of monetary policies
Table 4.4: Welfare Losses - Evaluation of simple monetary policy rules
Taylor Rule PEG
φpi 1.5 1.5 5 1.5 -
φy 0.125 0 0 1 -
σy 1.366391 1.370662 1.458503 1.350135 1.682293
σx 0.806274 0.831424 0.857563 0.665638 1.339094
σπH 0.892987 0.911011 0.914880 0.868607 2.163713
σ∆s 2.162405 2.119744 2.023694 2.436389 0
σtot 4.784296 4.773591 4.754520 4.844872 4.256270
Welfare loss 0.009313 0.009708 0.010094 0.007292 0.021014
-The analysis considers productivity shocks, external demand shocks, government spending
shocks, and cost-push shocks at the same time
-Assumption: ρ = 1
-φpi and φy are parameters corresponding to the Taylor rule
-σy, σx, σπ σ∆s and σtot represent variations in output, output gap, inflation, nominal
exchange rate and terms of trade.
This section shows the welfare implications of two alternative monetary policy rules. First,
a Taylor rule that considers four different combinations of weights on inflation and output gap,
going from an inflation targeting to a balanced target on output and inflation. And second, a
nominal exchange rate peg, which is currently in place in Bolivia. According to table 4.4, in
the presence of simultaneous exogenous perturbations, (namely, productivity, foreign demand,
government spending, and cost-push shocks) the monetary policy that minimizes welfare losses
correspond to a Taylor rule focus on targeting inflation and output gap. The least preferred
policy is an exchange rate peg regime24.
On the other hand, variations in the output gap and inflation are greater in the context of
a peg. Also, in line with Gali (2015) [26], an excess smoothness in the terms of trade arises
under a pegged regime, which is a consequence of the inability of prices (sticky) to compensate
for the constancy of the nominal exchange rate [39].
24Note that, the simulation and welfare analysis are performed using the software Dynare. In particular,
variances corresponds to the theoretical moments of variables under the estimated and calibrated model.
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In case shocks are only efficient, the most preferred monetary policy would be the one
focus only on inflation targeting25. However, given the presence of cost-push shocks on this
analysis, the most preferred monetary policy targets inflation and the output gap at the same
time, as the divine coincidence no longer holds.
4.4.1 Simple monetary policy rules
This section shows the welfare implications of two alternative simple monetary policy rules
in terms of observable variables. First, a Taylor rule that considers a producer and consumer
inflation targeting. And second, a nominal exchange rate peg, which is currently in place in
Bolivia26:
it = ρrit−1 + ψpiπt
it = ρrit−1 + ψpiπHt
∆st = 0
The main results reveal the welfare benefits of inflation targeting relative to an exchange
rate peg.
According to table 4.5, in the presence of simultaneous exogenous perturbations, (namely,
productivity, foreign demand, government spending, and cost-push shocks) the monetary
policy that minimizes welfare losses is a Taylor rule targeting domestic prices. The least
preferred policy is an exchange rate peg regime27.
On the other hand, variations on key variables such as output and domestic inflation
are greater in the context of a peg regime. Also, in line with Gali (2015) [26], an excess
smoothness in the terms of trade arises under this policy, given the inability of prices (sticky)
to compensate for the constancy of the nominal exchange rate [39].
As mentioned before, a typical Taylor rule generally considers a Consumer Price Inflation
index. Emerging countries such as Peru and Brazil focus on this objective. However, as shown
here and in line with De Paoli (2009) [21], a producer price inflation targeting is the one
with the best performance. These results also coincide with the welfare analysis of Parrado
(2004) [41], focus on the case of Chile. According to this author, the response of interest rates
to changes on inflation is greater in the context of a producer price inflation targeting. Hence,
given the uncovered interest parity condition, the fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate
performs the role of an automatic stabilizer. That explains the relatively low variability of
output, the high volatility of the real exchange rate, and thus the considerable variation of the
terms of trade.
Also is remarkable the fact that lower welfare losses are related to lower variability of
domestic inflation instead of CPI inflation. This result is in line with De Paoli (2009) [20] who
suggests that domestic price targeting conveys to the lowest welfare costs when multiple types
of perturbations ocurrs simultaneously.
When government spending shocks are present, a Taylor rule is desired given the upward
pressures on domestic inflation as a result of the expansion in the aggregate demand. The
same intuition holds in the case of external demand shocks. In the presence of productivity
perturbations, a Taylor rule is better than a pegged regime, as a result of the potential
25Indeed, as it is shown in the appendix, in the presence of efficient shocks, welfare losses are minimized
when the monetary authority focus only on inflation targeting.
26Following the same calibration as in the previous section
27Note that, the simulation and welfare analysis are performed using the software Dynare. In particular,
variances correspond to the unconditional variance under the estimated model.
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Table 4.5: Welfare Losses - Evaluation of simple monetary policy rules according to the
type of shock
Taylor Rule PEG
CPI PPI PEG
φpi 1.5 1.5 -
σy 1.37066201 1.36079207 1.682293
σx 0.83142429 0.70942044 1.339094
σπH 0.91101129 0.46151344 2.163713
σ∆s 2.11974488 3.27175809 0
σtot 4.77359149 5.06121415 4.256270
Productivity 0.00231938 0.00129827 0.004301
Ext. demand 0.00343266 0.00098918 0.013346
Gov.spending 0.00154771 0.00143604 0.001719
Cost-push 0.00240842 0.00301173 0.001646
Welfare loss 0.00970817 0.00673521 0.021014
-Assumption: ρ = 1
-φpi is a parameter corresponding to the Taylor rule
deflationary effects and the efforts of the central bank to cut down interest rates to reactivate
the economy.
Finally, considering cost-push shocks, an exchange rate peg is preferred rather than a pure
inflation targeting based either on producer or consumer prices. According to Berger (2006) [8],
in this case, policies that focus on target output and inflation simultaneously, outperform
those concentrated only in maintain price stability since the divine coincidence no longer hold
under these circumstances.
But why do cost-push shocks perform better under a peg regime? When there is a markup
shock, there is a sudden reduction in output, as firms that are not allowed to reset their
prices immediately reduce production. Along with the sudden increase in prices, follows an
improvement of the terms of trade. This situation makes domestic products relatively more
expensive, lowering its competitiveness and generating downward pressures on the demand
for exports. Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed, it remains underappreciated which
stimulates the aggregate demand and thus production. That finally end up tightening the
output gap and improving welfare.
4.4.2 An alternative monetary policy rule
In this section, I characterize an alternative simple monetary rule that reflects the commit-
ment of the central bank to maintain a managed nominal exchange rate and target inflation.
Following Monacelli (2004) [39], I analyze the performance of this rule. As mentioned before,
more than 120 countries in the world maintain either a hard or a soft pegged regime, and
Bolivia is not the exception.
The monetary policy rules would be the following (Monacelli (2004) [39]):
it = ψpiπt + φs∆st (4.3)
it = ψpiπH,t + φs∆st (4.4)
where φs =
ws
(1−ws)
, and in particular:
32
CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION AND WELFARE ANALYSIS
• ws = 0→ is equivalent to a floating exchange rate regime
• ws ∈ (0, 1]→ represents a managed/fixed exchange rate regime
I will calibrate the value of ws at 0.76
28.
Table 4.6: Welfare losses-Evaluation of Monetary policy rule à la Monacelli
Hybrid rule Pure inflation targeting Peg
CPI PPI CPI PPI -
ωs 0.76 0.76 - - -
φpi 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Welfare loss 0.01708941 0.01552005 0.00970817 0.00673521 0.021014
-φpi is a parameter corresponding to the Taylor rule
-Assumption: ρ = 1Table 4.7 shows the welfare implications of the monetary policy rules analyzed in this
section. However, they are all inferior compared to a Taylor rule focus only on inflation
targeting of domestic prices.
There is a fundamental reason explaining why a pure inflation targeting is better than
the hybrid rule considered here. A potential depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
(ceteris paribus), trigger upward pressures on the interest rate. That channels a reduction in
consumption by intertemporal substitution. However, a nominal depreciation might be also
due to a fall in domestic prices, for instance as a result of a backward in the domestic demand.
Thus, the former could misguide a rise in interest rates when in fact, the appropriate policy is
a reduction of the monetary instrument to avoid a further deflation.
Besides, a hybrid rule outperforms a pegged regime in terms of welfare. In this way, those
countries that currently focus only on maintaining a pure fixed exchange rate regime, such
as Bolivia, can reduce welfare losses by implementing a hybrid rule. The latter policy has
multiple advantages: First, it allows for clear communication of the Central Bank, improving
the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Second, and most important, it takes into account
the "fear to float" typical of those countries that currently target only an exchange rate peg.
According to the impossible trilemma, the Central Bank can commit to an independent
monetary policy, i.e. set interest rates, and manage the exchange rate peg if and only if there
are interventions in the capital markets to prevent investors from taking advantage of arbitrage
opportunities. Thus, if the monetary authorities implement a hybrid simple rule, they should
take into account the relevance of capital controls for the success of its policy.
28Monacelli (2004) [39] computes this value to reproduce a proportional change in the volatility of the
nominal exchange rate in line with the data observed during the decade of the 60s when industrialized countries
maintained a fixed /managed exchange rate regime.
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Chapter 5
Commodity price shocks in a small open
economy
The analysis of the Bolivian economy would not be complete without taking into account
the commodity sector, whose revenues finance a distortionary subsidy on consumption.
According to the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development [45], Bolivia is
considered a commodity-dependent country, whose trade of raw materials accounts for 32
percent of exports1 and only 1.4 percent of imports2.
5.1 The model
The main features of the model extension are: The home country is the only producer
of commodities; the representative agent consumes a bundle of domestic (commodities and
non-commodities goods) and foreign goods; domestic households are the owners of firms
and contribute with labor to the production of home goods. The production function of
commodities displays decreasing returns to scale, and requires only labor as input. This
specification implies that profits coming from the aforementioned sector are higher than zero.
In contrast, the production function of non-commodity goods employs labor with constant
returns to scale.
In the case of Bolivia, the government is the owner of most of the natural resources3,
including gas, hydrocarbons, metals, and production of raw agricultural commodities4. Also,
the government makes direct transfers to citizens, through various mechanisms such as periodic
distribution of conditional transfers to the aging population, students and pregnant women,
and also subsidizes the price of imported fuels and diesel. Under these particular characteristics,
I will assume that profits from the commodity sector (which are higher than zero given the
decreasing returns to scale) are channeled through a distortionary subsidy on consumption.
Further, the main features regarding the notation or concepts (such as the home bias in
consumption) are identical to the baseline model of chapter three, any additional modification
is clearly stated.
1World Trade Organization [45]
2Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to assume in the model that the only producer of commodities is the
home country
3See Lasa (2016) [32]
4There are several State-Owned enterprises in Bolivia dedicated to the production of natural gas, lithium
and basic alimentary products. See IMF Bolivia Article IV (2018) [10]Gysel (2016) [29]
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5.1.1 Households - Intratemporal choice
As in the baseline model, the composite consumption C and price index P are respectively
given by:
C =
(
v
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F
) θ
θ−1
(5.1)
P = (vP 1−θH + (1− v)P
1−θ
F )
1
1−θ (5.2)
where CH and CF are the indices of consumption of home and foreign goods, θ > 0 is the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between both of them and v is the home bias in
consumption. The demands for home and foreign goods are the following:
CH = v
(
PH
P
)−θ
C ; CF = (1− v)
(
PF
P
)−θ
C (5.3)
where the home bias v is a function of the degree of openness λ and the size of the economy
n, such that (1− v) = (1− n)λ. As in the baseline model, the size of the domestic economy
tends to zero (n→ 0).
In this model, the index of consumption of home goods CH is now given by:
CH = ((1− ω)
1
ιC
ι−1
ι
N + ω
1
ιC
ι−1
ι
O )
ι
ι−1 (5.4)
where CN and CO are the indexes of consumption of non-commodity and commodity goods,
ι > 0 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between both of them and ω is the
share of commodities in the consumption bundle. Equation 5.4 assumes that country H is the
only producer of commodities5. The consumption based price index is the following:
PH = ((1− ω)P
1−ι
N + ωP
1−ι
O )
1
1−ι (5.5)
Thus, the optimal allocation of commodities and non-commodity goods in the home economy
is:
CN = (1− ω)
(
PN
PH
)−ι
CH ; CO = ω
(
PO
PH
)−ι
CH (5.6)
As in the baseline model, agents of the domestic country maximize their consumption of
differentiated goods. Thus the domestic demand functions of a generic good z produced in
country H (non-commodity and commodity) and country F are:
cHN(z) =
1
n
(
p(z)
PN
)
−σt
CN ; c
H
O (z) =
1
n
(
p(z)
PO
)
−σt
CO ; c
F
O(z) =
1
1− n
(
p(z)
PF
)
−σt
C
where σt is the elasticity of substitution among varieties. Also, a country-specific domestic
public expenditure is allocated among home commodity and non-commodity goods according
to the following demands:
g(z) =
1
n
(
p(z)
PN
)
−σt
GN ; g(z) =
1
n
(
p(z)
PO
)
−σt
GO
5This assumption is reasonable, given that in the case of Bolivia, commodities represent 32% of exports,
while only 1.4% of imports [45]
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The government budget constraint in the home country is
PNt G
N
t + P
O
t G
O
t = PH,tTrt
where fluctuations in government spending GNt and G
O
t are exogenous and financed by lump-
sum taxes Trt.
Further, the representative agent’s budget constraint now takes into account the profits
from the sale of commodity and non-commodity goods, such that Πt = Π
O
t +Π
N
t :
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (ps,t + dt)Zt−1 +WtNt +Π
N
t
+ΠO
t
− PtTrt ≥ Bt + pz,tZt + PtCt
where total consumption is a composite of foreign and home goods: PTCT = PFCF + PNCN +
POCO. On the other hand, total labor in the domestic economy is described by the following
function:
N = (φ
1
u (NN)
u−1
u + (1− φ)
1
u (NO)
u−1
u )
u
u−1 (5.7)
where NN and NO are the indexes of non-commodity and commodity labor, u > 0 is the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between both of them, and φ is the share of non-
commodity labor of total labor. The wage index is written as:
W = (φ(WN)u−1 + (1− φ)(WO)u−1)
1
1−u
And the optimal labor supply in the commodity and non-commodity sector in the home
country is:
NN = φ
(
WN
W
)
−u
N ; NO = (1− φ)
(
WO
W
)
−u
N (5.8)
5.1.2 Firms
• Non-Commodity firms
The representative non-commodity firm use only labor as an input. Its production function
displays constant returns to scale:
Y Nt (z) = AtN
N
t (z)
where z is a generic differentiated good. After minimizing the cost subject to the production
function, the loglinearized real marginal cost in terms of domestic prices pH is the following:
mcNt = w
N
t − pH − at
As in the baseline model, productivity shocks follows an auto-regressive process ǫt ∼ iid N(0, σa):
at = ρaat−1 + ǫa,t (5.9)
And, as described in section 3.2, the Calvo price setting mechanism yields the Phillips curve
for the non-commodity producing firms. Here, I also assume a time varying markup:
πNH,t = βπ
N
H,t+1 + ζmˆc
r
t + ζµt (5.10)
with ζ = (1−αβ)(1−α)
α
and µt capturing deviations of the efficient output from the natural
output, such that ǫµ,t ∼ iid N(0, σµ):
µt = ρµµt−1 + ǫµ,t
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• Commodity firms
Domestic commodity firms use only labor, and minimize their costs subject to the production
function:
Y Ot (z) = A
O
t N
k
O,t(z)
where the parameter k < 1 implies decreasing returns to scale. Thus, under this specification,
profits from the commodity sales are6:
ΠOt = (1− k)PO,t(z)YO,t(z) (5.11)
Following the same steps as in section 3.2, the loglinearized real marginal cost in terms of
domestic prices pH is the following:
mcot = kw
O
t − pH − ao,t
where ao,t is aggregate productivity in the commodity sector and follows an auto-regressive
process AR(1) with Gaussian shocks ǫao,t ∼ iid N(0, σao):
aot = ρaoao,t−1 + ǫao,t (5.12)
Commodity firms in the small open economy take prices as given. Those follow a stochastic
process ǫo,t ∼ iid N(0, σo):
po,t = ρopo,t−1 + ǫo,t (5.13)
5.1.3 Intertemporal choice
The production function of the representative commodity firm displays decreasing returns
to scale. Its profits finance a distortionary subsidy on consumption τt, such that the following
equality holds7:
ΠOt = (1− k)PO,t(z)YO,t(z) = τtPtCt (5.14)
Hence, the representative agent’s budget constraint now is written as:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (ps,t + dt)Zt−1 +WtNt +Πt − PtTrt ≥ Bt + pz,tZt + (1− τt)PtCt
Also, with the subsidy in place, the intertemporal optimization problem yields as:
β(1 + it)Et
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt(1− τt)
Pt+1(1− τt+1)
)
= 1 (5.15)
Nηt
C−ρt
=
Wt
Pt(1− τt)
(5.16)
The loglinearized equations are given by:
ct = Et+1(ct+1)−
1
ρ
(it − Etπt+1 − γ + vt+1 − vt) (5.17)
ηnt + ρct = wt − pt + vt (5.18)
Where vt = −ln(1− τt), γ = −ln(β), it = ln(1+ it) and πt+1 = pt+1−pt is the home consumer
price index inflation.
6Derivations in appendix F
7Alternatively, it can be the case that the profits from the oil sector are collected by the government and
finance a distortionary subsidy on consumption
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5.1.4 Interaction between the small open economy and the rest of
the world
• Terms of trade and inflation
As the representative consumer in the domestic country consumes home and foreign goods,
the loglinearized price indexes imply:
πt = (1− λ)πH,t + λπF,t (5.19)
πH,t = (1− ω)πN,t + ωπO,t (5.20)
Plugging 5.19 in 5.20, the overall CPI inflation is:
πt = ωπOt + (1− ω)πN,t + λ∆tott (5.21)
where ∆tott = π
F
t − π
H
t . Therefore, a shock in commodity prices triggers an increase in the
domestic inflation. There is also an improvement in the terms of trade, which is associated
with an overall appreciation of the real exchange rate.
• Terms of trade and the exchange rate
As in the baseline model, the relationship between the nominal exchange rate st and the terms
of trade is the following:
tott = st − p
H
t + p
∗
t (5.22)
Thus, a nominal depreciation means that home products are relatively cheaper than their
foreign counterparts. That in turn determines that per each unit of domestic goods, the home
country can purchase a lower proportion of foreign ones. Rewriting equation 5.22 in terms
of variations: ∆tott = ∆st − π
H
t + π
∗
t . Finally, the relationship between the exchange rate
and the terms of trade is identical to the baseline model, as the definition of terms of trade
remains unchanged:
qt = (1− λ)tott (5.23)
where λ is the degree of openness. Under the assumption that country H is the only producer
of commodities, an exogenous increase on its prices triggers a real exchange rate appreciation.
That is because Home prices are a composite of commodity and non-comomodity goods.
• International risk sharing
Since the international risk sharing is derived from the home and foreign Euler equations, as
in the baseline model based on Gali and Monacelli (2005) [27], the loglinearized risk sharing
condition is written as:
ct = c
∗
t +
(1− λ)
ρ
tott +
1
ρ
vt (5.24)
where ρ is the coefficient of risk aversion, λ is the degree of openness and vt is the subsidy
on consumption financed by the profits from the commodity sector.
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5.1.5 Equilibrium
For each generic good z produced in the domestic non-commodity sector, the equilibrium
implies that total production equalizes home and foreign consumption. Therefore, the following
condition must be satisfied:
yN(h) = n(cHN(z) + g(z)) + (1− n)(c
∗
N
H(z))
replacing subsequently the equations derived in section 5.1.1:
y(h) = n
1
n
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
(CN +G
N) + (1− n)
1
n
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
C∗N
y(h) =
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
(
(1− ω)
(
PN
PH
)−ι
CH +G
N
)
+(1−n)
1
n
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
(1−ω∗)
(
PN
QPH
)
−ι
C∗H
y(h) =
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
(
(1− ω)
(
PN
PH
)−ι
v
(
PH
P
)−θ
C +GN
)
+(1− n)
1
n
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
(1− ω∗)
(
PN
QPH
)
−ι
v∗
(
PH
QP
)
−θ
C
Recalling the definition of home bias (1 − v) = (1 − n)λ; v∗ = nλ, simplifying and finally
taking the limit when n→ 0, holds:
yN(h) =
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
((
PN
PH
)−ι (PH
P
)−θ
((1− ω)(1− λ)C) +GN
)
+
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
(
PN
QPH
)
−ι (
PH
QP
)
−θ
((1− ω∗)λC∗)
Assuming symmetric preferences, i.e. ω = ω∗, yields the market clearing condition in the
home non-commodity sector:
yN(h) =
(
p(h)
PN
)
−σt
((
PN
PH
)−ι (PH
P
)−θ
(1− ω)
(
(1− λ)C +Qθ+ιλC∗
)
+GN
)
Similarly, for each generic good h produced in the commodity sector, the equilibrium implies:
yO(h) =
(
p(h)
PO
)
−σt
((
PO
PH
)−ι (PH
P
)−θ
(1− ω)
(
(1− λ)C +Qθ+ιλC∗
)
+GO
)
5.1.6 Monetary Policy
For this particular experiment, I will consider a nominal exchange rate peg that simply
implies ∆st = 0
39
CHAPTER 5. COMMODITY PRICE SHOCKS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
5.2 Simulation
The model is estimated using a Bayessian approach for those parameters for which there is
only a prior belief about their value:
V = [k, ι, u, ω, ρo, σo, ρao, σao]
where the parameter k represents the share of labor in the commodity production and displays
decreasing returns to scale. ι is the elasticity of substitution between commodity and non-
commodity goods, u is the elasticity of substitution between commodity and non-commodity
labor and ω is the share of commodities in the consumption bundle. ρo, σo, ρao, σao are the
coefficients corresponding to the auoregressive process with Gaussian shocks of the commodity
prices and aggregate technology in that sector.
5.2.1 Data and Parametrization
In this case the vector of observable variables is:
YT = [yn, yo, ct, qt, πt]
As in the baseline model the sources of the quarterly data are the Central Bank of Bolivia
and the National Institute of Statistics. In particular, the commodity output yo corresponds
to agricultural and livestock products, hunting, fishing, oil, natural gas non-metallic minerals,
and metallic minerals. The remaining economic activities corresponds to the non-commodity
output yn. Concerning the data, the deseasonalization and detrending are identical to the
baseline model. The following table describes the parameters calibrated:
Table 5.1: Parametrization
Description Par Value Source
Subjective discount factor β 0.98 Zeballos (2018)
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 1 Zeballos (2018)
Inverse of labor supply elasticity η 0.5 Cerezo (2011)
Degree of openness λ 0.32 Zeballos (2018)
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution θ 0.8 Amado (2014)
Calvo parameter α 0.39 Cerezo (2011)
Share of non-oil labor φ 0.8 National Accounts
Government spending persistence ρg 0.12 Salas (2018)
S.D. government spending σg 0.0056 Salas (2018)
Productivity persistence non-commodity sector ρa 0.2659 Baseline estimation
S.D. prod. shock non-commodity sector σa 0.0140 Baseline estimation
Cost-push shock persistence ρu 0.3218 Baseline estimation
S.D. of cost-push shock σu 0.0074 Baseline estimation
Ext. demand persist. ρc∗ 0.7941 Baseline estimation
S.D. ext. demand shock σc∗ 0.0286 Baseline estimation
Government spending persistence ρg 0.12 Salas (2018)
S.D. government spending σg 0.0056 Salas (2018)
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The only additional calibrated parameter with respect to the baseline model is the share
of non-commodity labor φ, which is directly computed from the national accounts considering
the average along 2009 and 2019.
5.2.2 Priors and Posteriors distributions
Table 5.2 reports the main results of the Bayesian estimation. Regarding the selection of
priors, the share of labor in the commodity production k is set at 0.3. This specification is
based on the analysis of Ferrero et al (2017) [24] who estimates this parameter in particular
for the oil sector. The elasticity of substitution between commodity and non-commodity goods
takes into account the research of Medina et al (2007) [37] that considers the elasticity of
substitution between oil and non-oil goods in the case of Chile.
There is no prior reference about the elasticity of substitution between commodity and
non-commodity labor. Thereby, to set a prior belief, I consider that the share of labor in the
production of raw materials has been maintained close to 20% along the last decade with
minimal variations over time. The prior belief about the share of commodities in consumption
is set at 0.2 based upon the evaluation of the US Department of Agriculture [25]. The prior
related to the standard deviation of the commodity price shock is based on the analysis of
Tenreyro (2019) [44] who performs an empirical analysis for the case of Argentina.
Finally, the shape of the prior distributions are: Normal for elasticities, Beta for shares
and persistence parameters and Inverse Gamma for standard deviations of shocks.
Table 5.2: Bayesian Estimation of Parameters
Prior Dist. Posterior Dist.
Description Par Density Mean Mean 90%interval
Labor share commodity prod. k Beta 0.3 0.2979 0.1329 0.4562
Elasticity subst. bet. commodity and non-
commodity goods
ι Normal 0.3 0.0173 0.0078 0.0265
Elasticity subst. bet. commodity and non-
commodity labor
u Normal 0.3 0.0131 0.0045 0.0209
Commodity share in consumption ω Beta 0.2 0.3466 0.1382 0.5485
Commodity price persistence ρo Beta 0.5 0.2817 0.1581 0.4034
Persistence in commodity sector productivity ρao Beta 0.5 0.3511 0.1964 0.4980
SD commodity price shock σo Inv.Gam 0.15 0.1641 0.1322 0.1949
SD commodity sector productivity shock σao Inv.Gam 0.2 0.1978 0.1585 0.2356
5.2.3 Results and Welfare analysis
A commodity price shock affects the economy in two different ways. On the one hand, it
unmistakably increases the prices of home goods. And on the other, it affects total consumption,
as it finances a distortionary subsidy on this variable. Therefore, as a result of the first channel
of transmission, there are upward pressures on domestic inflation, and thus a terms of trade
shock. That improves the competitiveness of the home country as foreign goods are relatively
cheaper than domestic ones. Second, a rise in commodity prices leads to higher profits in the
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commodity sector which leads to a rise in its production. However the increment in production
is limited, given the decreasing returns to scale
On the other hand, a shock on the subsidy in consumption leads also to multiple effects.
First, there is an expansion in output (the effect is similar to a rise in the demand for total
goods). Consequently there are inflationary pressures coming from those firms able to reset
their prices. Second, the relative improvement in competitiveness generates upward pressures
on the consumption of foreign goods. Although, demand for domestic products is not far
behind given its relative share on the consumption bundle.
Figure 5.1: Impulse responses to commodity price shocks
Welfare analysis: Here, I follow exactly the same process of evaluation as in section 4.4,
i.e. I compute the second order approximation of the utility function. Besides an exchange
rate peg, I consider a Taylor rule of the form: it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ) ∗ (ψpiπ + ψyy), where
calibration of the parameters follows the Chilean analysis of Medina et al(2007) [37]: ρ = 0.7,
ψpi = 1.5 and ψy = 0.5. The welfare evaluation shows that the most preferred monetary policy
is a Taylor rule rather than a PEG in the case of every shock analyzed separately and all of
them evaluated jointly, although, the welfare differences are tiny little, as it is common in the
business cycles literature. Appendix F shows this results in detail.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The purpose of this work was twofold. First, assess the dynamic effects of efficient and
inefficient exogenous perturbations in a small open economy, by comparing their repercussions
under alternative monetary policies. And second, provide a prescription of a simple monetary
policy rule associated with the minimal welfare losses in the case of Bolivia.
To reach that goal, I built a model for a small open economy with imperfect competition
and staggered prices. I took into account the presence of external demand, government
spending, productivity, and cost-push shocks to finally derive a canonical representation of
the system. To simulate it, I calibrated and estimated the parameters based on quarterly data
from Bolivia for the periods between 2009 to 2019. Then, I extended the model by taking
into account a distortionary subsidy on consumption financed by the profits of the commodity
sector.
Concerning the first aim of this work, two utmost results were presented. First, under a
Taylor rule there are lower deviations of the relevant output gap and inflation. And second,
there is a terms of trade smoothness under a pegged exchange rate regime, in line with Gali
and Monacelli (2005) [27].
In particular, each exogenous perturbation elicits a different set of dynamics. First, a
government spending shock leads to a contemporaneous peak fiscal multiplier of 0.875 under
a pegged regime, and 0.75 under a Taylor rule. However, there are downward pressures on
private consumption given the negative wealth effect.
Second, cost-push shocks trigger a deeper slowdown in output under a Taylor rule given the
emerging dilemma between inflation and output gap stabilization. Also, there are downward
pressures in the real exchange rate, which are lower in the context of a pegged regime, given the
terms of trade smoothness characteristic of this policy. Third, a technological shock expands
the efficient output, as there is a rise in the capacity of production in the economy.
And fourth, an increase of 2.8 percent in the external demand generates a contemporaneous
rise in output, which is almost 1 percent higher under a pegged regime. There are also greater
deviations of the relevant output gap and inflation under that policy.
Thus, an exchange rate peg triggers in general greater expansions in output in comparison
to a Taylor rule. However, it exerts upward pressures on inflation and deviations of output
from its efficient level, which generates negative welfare implications.
Concerning the prescription of a simple monetary policy rule associated with the minimum
welfare losses for Bolivia, the results suggest that when the full set of shocks occurs simul-
taneously, a Taylor rule is the preferred one. Yet, by focusing only on inefficient exogenous
perturbations, the ranking of monetary policy aligns in the first place, an exchange rate peg.
This scenario shows the typical ineffectiveness of inflation targeting under this case and the
potential success of alternative simple monetary rules.
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Regarding the extension of the model, I considered the dynamic effects of a shock in the
commodity prices. In this context, profits coming from firms producing commodities (whose
production function displays decreasing returns to scale) finance a distortionary subsidy on
consumption. This exogenous perturbation show an expansion in consumption for foreign
goods, given downward pressures on the real exchange rate.
The natural refinement of this work would be the extension of the model considering
incomplete markets, the analysis of financial frictions, and an informal sector. Also, it would
be useful to contrast the behavior of the actual data with the results provided by the model,
and the computation of the output gap through sophisticated techniques such as the Kalman
Filter. Finally, it is possible to model a number of different scenarios given that DSGE models
are the laboratory of experimentation in macroeconomics.
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Appendix A
Derivations
A.1 Demand of home and foreign goods
The home country maximizes total consumption 3.2 by choosing both home and foreign
goods:
maximize
CH ,CF
C(CH , CF ) = (v
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F )
θ
θ−1
subject to PC ≥ PHCH + PFCF
Where the nominal consumption of home and foreign goods exhaust the nominal value of total
consumption. Therefore, setting the Lagrange and deriving the first- order conditions, yields:
L(CH , CF , λ) = (v
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H + (1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F )
θ
θ−1 + λ(PC − PHCH − PFCF )
∂L
∂CH
= C
1
θ v
1
θC
−
1
θ
H − λPH = 0 → CH = (λPH)
−θvC
∂L
∂CF
= C
1
θ (1− v)
1
θC
−
1
θ
F − λPF = 0 → CF = (λPF )
−θ(1− v)C
⇒ CH = CF
(
PF
PH
)θ v
1− v
(A.1)
Plugging A.1 in the objective function and rearranging terms using the home price index 3.10,
the optimal allocation for home and foreign goods is:
C = (v
1
θ (CF
(
PF
PH
)θ v
1− v
)
θ−1
θ + (1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F )
θ
θ−1
C
θ−1
θ = v(1− v)
1−θ
θ C
θ−1
θ
F P
1−θ
H P
θ−1
F + (1− v)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F P
θ−1
F
P1−θ
F
C
θ−1
θ = C
θ−1
θ
F P
θ−1
F (1− v)
1−θ
θ P1−θ
CH = v
(
PH
P
)−θ
C (A.2)
CF = (1− v)
(
PF
P
)−θ
C (A.3)
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Similarly, foreign agents choose the demand of home and foreign goods which can be expressed
in terms of domestic prices by applying the law of one price 3.17 and the definition of the real
exchange rate 3.16:
C∗H = v
∗
(
P ∗H
P ∗
)−θ
C∗ → C∗H = v
∗
(
PH
PQ
)
−θ
C∗ (A.4)
C∗F = (1− v
∗)
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−θ
C∗ → C∗F = (1− v
∗)
(
PF
PQ
)
−θ
C∗ (A.5)
A.2 Demand among the differentiated home and for-
eign goods
At this stage, agents of the domestic country maximize their consumption of the different
varieties of domestically produced goods, thus:
maximize
c(z)
CH(c(h)) =
((
1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
0
c(h)
σ−1
σ dh
) σ
σ−1
subject to PHCH ≥
∫ n
0
p(h)c(h)dh
In the same way, the Lagrange and the first-order condition with respect to domestic con-
sumption of the differentiated home good is:
σ
σ − 1
((
1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
0
c(h)
σ−1
σ dh
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
(
1
n
) 1
σ
(c(h))−
1
σ − λtp(h) = 0
(
1
n
) 1
σ
C
1
σ
H(c(h))
−
1
σ = λtp(h)
c(h) =
1
n
(λtp(h))
−σCH (A.6)
Plugging A.6 in the budget constraint and using the definition of the price index of domestic
goods 3.12, the representation of the Lagrangian operator is λt:
∫ n
0
p(h)(
1
n
(λtp(h))
−σCH)dh = PHCH
λ−σP 1−σ = PH → λt =
1
PH
(A.7)
Thus, the domestic demand for home and foreign differentiated goods is the following:
c(h) =
1
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σ
CH (A.8)
c(f) =
1
1− n
(
p(f)
PF
)
−σ
CF (A.9)
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An analogous process stands for the foreign demand for goods produced in country H and F,
which can be expressed in terms of domestic prices by applying the law of one price 3.17
c∗(h) =
1
n
(
p∗(h)
P ∗H
)
−σ
C∗H → c
∗(h) =
1
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σ
C∗H (A.10)
c∗(f) =
1
1− n
(
p∗(f)
P ∗F
)
−σ
C∗F → c
∗(f) =
1
1− n
(
p(f)
PF
)
−σ
C∗F (A.11)
According to De Paoli (2009), the government of the home country has preferences for
differentiated domestic goods, therefore its maximization problem yields as:
maximize
g(z)
G(g(h)) =
((
1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
0
g(h)
σ−1
σ dh
) σ
σ−1
subject to PHG ≥
∫ n
0
p(h)g(h)dh
(A.12)
Thus, the public domestic demand is the following:
g(h) =
1
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σ
G (A.13)
Similarly, the foreign government has preferences only for differentiated foreign goods:
g∗(f) =
1
1− n
(
p(f)
PF
)
−σ
G∗ (A.14)
A.3 Total demand for differentiated home and foreign
goods
The total demand for a generic good h produced in country H is given by the aggregation
of its domestic and foreign demands:
y(h) = n(c(h) + g(h)) + (1− n)c∗(h) (A.15)
Replacing the corresponding demands derived previously:
y(h) =
n
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σ
(CH +G) +
(1− n)
n
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σ
C∗H
y(h) =
(
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PH
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P
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(
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PQ
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PH
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)−θ vC + (1− n)
n
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(
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Q
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−θ

+G


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Applying the definition of home bias described earlier (v, v∗), and then taking into account the
limit of the home economy size to zero (n→ 0) in order to represent the small open economy
and the rest of the world, the total demand for the differentiated goods is the following:
y(h) =
(
p(h)
PH
)
−σ

(PH
P
)−θ (1− λ+ nλ)C + (1 + n)
n
nλC∗
(
1
Q
)
−θ

+G


y(h) =
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p(h)
PH
)
−σ

(PH
P
)−θ (1− λ)C + λC∗
(
1
Q
)
−θ

+G

 (A.16)
Therefore:
Yt =

(PH
P
)−θ (1− λ)C + λC∗
(
1
Q
)
−θ

+G

 (A.17)
Following De Paoli(2009), the log linearied equation A.17 around the symmetric steady state
is1:
yt = −θ(ph) + (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + θλqt + gt (A.18)
where ph = Ph/P and variables in lowercase denotes deviations from the steady state and
capital letters variables at the steady state. Section A.3 shows the derivations of the aggregate
demand only in terms of ct, c
∗
t , qt and gt.
Similarly, the total consumption for differentiated foreign goods is:
y(f) = nc(f) + (1− n)(c∗(f) + g∗(f)) (A.19)
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−σ
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)
−σ
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(A.20)
Now, I am going to show an alternative representation of equation A.18, such that it is
written only in terms of ct, c
∗
t , qt and gt.
1The steady state conditions considers:
• PHt /P
H
t−1 = P
F
t /P
F
t−1 = 1
• The price index is normalized, such that P¯H = P¯F
• The steady state versions of the demand equation in the domestic and foreign country are: Y¯ =
(1− λ)C¯ + λC¯∗ +G and Y¯ ∗ = C¯∗ + G¯∗
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Dividing the domestic price index by PH,t, using the definition of terms of trade and the
fact that n→ 0 such that (1− v) = λ:
Pt
PH,t
=
((1− λ)P 1−θH + λP
1−θ
F )
1
1−θ
PH,t
Pt
PH,t
=
((1− λ)P 1−θH + λP
1−θ
F )
1
1−θ
P
1−θ
1−θ
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PH,t
)1−θ
1
1−θ
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(
(1− λ) + λTOT 1−θt
) 1
1−θ
PH,t
Pt
=
(
λ(TOT 1−θt − 1) + 1
) 1
θ−1 (A.21)
Following De Paoli, the normalization of the price index leads to PF = PH at the steady state.
Hence, loglinearizing equation A.21 yields:
pH,t
pt
= −λtott (A.22)
Plugging equation in A.18 and using the relationship between terms of trade and real exchange
rate described in equation (qt = (1− λ)tott), the following relationship holds:
yt = (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + γqt + gt (A.23)
where γ = θλ(2−λ)
(1−λ)
Similarly, the aggregate foreign output when all goods are in equilibrium is:
y∗t = c
∗
t + g
∗
t (A.24)
A.4 Utility maximization
The representative household maximizes his utility and optimally shares risk with the rest
of the world by trading securities:
maximize U(C,N) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−ρt
1− ρ
−
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
subject to WtNt − PtTrt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (pz,t + dt)Zt−1
≥ Bt + pz,tZt + PtCt
The intertemporal problem can be written as:
L = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt(
C1−ρt
1− ρ
−
N1+ηt
1 + η
) + λt(WtNt − PtTrt +Πt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (pz,t + dt)Zt−1
−Bt − pz,tZt − PtCt)
∂L
∂Ct
= βtC−ρt − λtPt = 0
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∂L
∂Nt
= βtNηt − λtWt = 0
∂L
∂Bt
= λt+1(1 + it)− λt = 0
The Euler Equation:
β(1 + it)Et
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
)
= 1 (A.25)
Here, the stochastic discount factor Qt,t+1, that governs the rate at which the consumer is
willing to intertemporaly substitute consumption is defined by:
Qt,t+1 = βEt
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
)
(A.26)
The labor optimality condition is:
Nηt
C−ρt
=
Wt
Pt
(A.27)
A.5 Cost minimization
The representative domestic firm mimimizes costs in the following way:
minimize
nt(h)
Wtnt(z)
subject to Atn(z) = yt(z)
L = Wtnt(z) + λt(z)(yt(z)− Atn(z))
The first order condition with respect to labor stands as:
∂L
∂nt(z)
= wt − λt(z)At = 0
where the multiplier on the constraint has the interpretation of marginal cost which is common
across all firms and can be written as:
λt =
Wt
At
(A.28)
A.6 Calvo Price Setting mechanism
maximize
p˜(h)
∞∑
k=0
αkEt(Qt,t+k ((yt,t+k(h)(p˜t(h)−MC
n
t,t+k)))
subject to yt,t+k(h) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)
−σ

(PH,t+k
Pt+k
)
−θ

(1− λ)Ct+k + λC∗t+k
(
1
Qt+k
)
−θ

+Gt+k


⇒ y˜t+k(h) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)
−σ
Yt+k
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Note that the future stream of nominal marginal costs MCt+k corresponds to the previ-
ous derivation in 3.43. Substituting the demand constraint in the objective function and
reorganizing terms:
→
∞∑
k=0
αkEt

Qt,t+k



( p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)
−σ
Yt+k)

(p˜t(h)−MCnt+k)




→
∞∑
k=0
αkEt

Qt,t+k

( 1
PH,t+k
)
−σ
Yt+k(p˜t(h))
(1−σ) − (p˜t(h))
(−σ)
(
1
PH,t+k
)
−σ
Yt,tMC
n
t+k




Deriving the first order conditions with respect to the optimal price p˜t(h):
∞∑
k=0
αkEt

Qt,t+k

(1− σ)
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)
−σ
Yt+k + σ(p˜t(h))
(−1)
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)
−σ
Yt+kMC
n
t+k



 = 0
∞∑
k=0
αkEt
(
Qt,t+k
(
(1− σ)yt+k(h) + σ(p˜t(h))
(−1)yt+k(h)MC
n
t+k
))
= 0
Multiply both sides of the equation by − (p˜t(h))
(σ−1)
and factorizing:
∞∑
k=0
αkEt
(
Qt,t+kyt+k(h)
(
p˜t(h)−
σ
(σ − 1)
MCnt+k
))
= 0
In the style of De Paoli (2009), I take into account markup shocks providing from a time
varying elasticity of substitution between goods, which generates inefficiency given the markup
fluctuations over time:
µt =
σt
(1− σt)
(A.29)
that follows an autoregressive process (AR(1)) with white noise: ǫµ,t ∼ iid N(0, σµ):
µt = ρµµt−1 + ǫµ,t (A.30)
Replacing the stochastic discount factor: Qt,t+k = β
kEt
(
Ct+k
Ct
)
−σ
Pt
Pt+k
and simplifying some
common terms:
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEt
(
(Ct+k)
−σ
Pt+k
yt+k(h)
(
p˜t(h)− µtMC
n
t+k
))
= 0
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEt
(
(Ct+k)
−σpt−1(h)
Pt+k(h)
yt+k(h)
(
p˜t(h)
pt−1(h)
−
Pt+k(h)
Pt+k(h)
µtMC
n
t+k
pt−1(h)
))
= 0
According to Gali and Monacelli(2005), the following definitions of inflation and real marginal
cost holds:
πH,t−1,t+k =
Pt+k
Pt−1
and MCt+k =
MCnt+k
PH,t+k
⇒
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEt
(
(Ct+k)
−σpt−1(h)
Pt+k(h)
yt+k(h)
(
p˜t(h)
pt−1(h)
− µtπH,t−1,t+kMCt+k
))
= 0
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Log-linearizing the infinite sum 2 around the zero-inflation steady state and taking into account
the following properties:
mct = −log
σt
(σt − 1)
= −µt ; MCt+k −mct+k = m˜ct+k
⇒ p˜t(h)− pt−1(h) = (1− αβ)
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)k(m˜ct+k + πH,t) (A.31)
The previous equation obeys a first order stochastic difference equation,3 thus:
p˜t(h)− pt−1(h) = αβ(p˜t+1(h)− pt(h)) + (1− αβ)(m˜ct + πH,t) (A.32)
Under the Calvo price setting specification, the price index evolves according to the following
law of motion:
(PH,t)
1−σ = αP 1−σH,t−1 + (1− α)(p˜t(h))
(1−σ) (A.33)
Its corresponding log-linearized version is given by:
pH,t = αpH,t−1 + (1− α)p˜H,t
pH,t − pH,t−1 = (1− α)(p˜H,t − pH,t−1)
pH,t − pH,t−1 = (1− α)(p˜H,t − pH,t−1) → πH,t = (1− α)(p˜H,t − pH,t−1) (A.34)
Finally plugging A.34 in A.32 the New Keynessian Philips curve for the home country is:
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζm˜ct (A.35)
where ζ = (1−αβ)(1−α)
α
.
A.7 Terms of trade and inflation
The log-linearized version of the terms of trade is the following:
TOTt =
PF,t
PH,t
⇒ tott = pF,t − pH,t (A.36)
The log-linearized version of the domestic price index described in equation 3.10 can be
expressed as:
pt = vpt,h + (1− v)pt,f (A.37)
Combining equations A.36 and A.37, the level of prices of the small open economy is positively
correlated to the domestic prices adjusted by the terms of trade and the home bias:
pt = pt,F − v(tott)
pt = pt,F − pt,h − v(tott) + pt,h → pt = tott − v(tott) + pt,h
pt = pt,h + (1− v)tott (A.38)
2
∑
∞
k=0 x
k = 11−x
3yt = a
∑
∞
k=0 b
kEtxt+k ⇒ yt = axt + bEtyt+1 (y, x random variables and a, b constants)
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By definition, the log-linearized version of inflation is the following:
πt = pt − pt−1 and πt,H = pt,H − pt−1,H
plugging it in equation A.38 and using A.36, the relationship between home inflation and
terms of trade changes:
πt + pt−1 = πt,H + pt−1,H + (1− v)(pt,F − pt,H)
πt = πt,H + pt−1,H + (1− v)pt,F − (1− v)pt,H − pt−1
πt = πt,H + pt−1,H + (1− v)pt,F − (1− v)pt,H − vpt−1,H − (1− v)pt−1,F
πt = πt,H + (1− v)pt−1,H − (1− v)pt−1,F + (1− v)pt,F − (1− v)pt,H
πt = πt,H − (1− v)(pt−1,F − pt−1,H) + (1− v)(pt,F − pt,H)
πt = πt,H + (1− v)∆tott (A.39)
A.8 Terms of trade and real exchange rate
Combining equations 3.54 and 3.53 holds:
qt = st + p
∗
t − pt
qt = tott + pH,t − pt (A.40)
Finally, using equations A.40 and A.38, it is obvious the positive relationship between the real
exchange rate and the terms of trade adjusted by the home bias:
qt = tott + pt,H − pt ⇒ qt = tott − (1− v)tott
qt = vtott (A.41)
A.9 Uncovered interest Parity
Under complete markets, households can invest in home and foreign bonds. So, the budget
constraint can be written as:
WtNt − PtTrt +Πt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (1+ i
∗
t−1
)St−1B
∗
t−1
+ (pz,t + dt)Zt−1
= Bt + pz,tZt + PtCt + StB
∗
t
The first order conditions with respect to home and foreign goods result in the following
expressions:
1 = β(1 + it)
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
1 = β(1 + i∗t )
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
St+1
St
Taking the ratio between both equations:
1 =
(1 + it)St
(1 + i∗t )St+1
Simplifying and loglinearizing:
it − i
∗
t = Et(∆st+1) (A.42)
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A.10 Risk Sharing conditions
According to Gali and Monacelli (2005) considering complete markets, the Euler Equation
corresponding to the intertemporal optimality condition in country H, yields for the repre-
sentative agent in country F. Thus, expressing foreign consumption in terms of the domestic
currency, and assuming that the nominal interest rate paid on the bond Bt is the same across
countries (Berthold, 2012):
βRtEt

(C∗t+1
C∗t
)
−ρ
P ∗t St
P ∗t+1St+1

 = 1
Equalizing the expression above with its domestic counterpart and recalling the definition of
the real exchange rate 3.16:
Et
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ Pt
Pt+1
)
= Et

(C∗t+1
C∗t
)
−ρ
P ∗t St
P ∗t+1St+1

 = 1
Et
((
Ct+1
Ct
)−ρ)
= Et

(C∗t+1
C∗t
)
−ρ
Qt
Qt+1

 = 1
After isolating Ct, the domestic consumption depends mainly on foreign consumption and the
real exchange rate:
Ct = Et
(
Ct+1
C∗t+1
Q
1
ρ
t+1
)
C∗tQ
1
ρ
t
According to Gali and Monacelli (2005), it is possible to assume symmetric initial conditions,
which implies zero net foreign asset holdings and thus same levels of future consumption in
county H and F. Hence, the expression above can be written as:
Ct = C
∗
tQ
1
ρ
t
And its log-linearized version:
ct = c
∗
t +
1
ρ
qt (A.43)
Combining equation A.43 with the alternative definition of the real exchange rate as a function
of the terms of trade derived in A.41:
ct = c
∗
t +
v
ρ
tott (A.44)
A.11 Equilibrium - Demand side
As derived previously, the total demand for home goods comes from the domestic (private
and public) and foreign consumption:
yt = (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + γq + gt (A.45)
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where γ = θλ(2−λ)
(1−λ)
. Plugging equation A.41 in A.45 one obtains the demand for home
goods in terms of the terms of trade. Thus, an improvement in tott produces a decrease in the
demand for domestic goods since foreign ones are cheaper:
yt = (1− λ)ct + λc
∗
t + vγtott + gt (A.46)
The total demand for foreign-produced goods corresponds to the log-linearized version of
the already derived equation A.24:
y∗t = c
∗
t + g
∗
t (A.47)
Inserting equation A.44, which corresponds to the definition of home consumption as a function
of the terms of trade, into equation A.46 yields:
yt = (1− λ)(c
∗
t +
vtott
ρ
) + λc∗t + vγtott + gt
yt = c
∗
t + (1− λ)
vtott
ρ
+ vγtott + gt
yt = c
∗
t + tott(
vγρ+ (1− λ)v
ρ
) + gt
yt = c
∗
t +
tott
ρv
+ gt where ρv =
ρ
vγρ+ (1− λ)v
Implementing the world demand clearing condition, the equation above is written as:
yt = y
∗
t − g
∗
t +
tott
ρv
+ gt (A.48)
Subsequently, isolating ct from the aggregate demand of domestic products A.45 and plugging
it in the log-linearized version of the home Euler equation 3.38 yields:
yt − λc
∗
t − vγtott − gt = yt+1 − λc
∗
t+1 − vγtott+1 − gt+1 −
(1− λ)(it − πt+1 − γ)
ρ
yt = yt+1 −
(1− λ)(it − πt+1 − γ)
ρ
− λ(c∗t+1 − c
∗
t )− vγ(tott+1 − tott)−∆gt+1
yt = yt+1 −
(1− λ)(it − πt+1 − γ)
ρ
− λ∆y∗t+1 + λ∆g
∗
t+1 − vγ∆tott+1 −∆gt+1 (A.49)
A.12 Supply side - The marginal cost
Recalling the log-linearized version of the production function up to a first order approx-
imation: nt = yt − at, the domestic Philips curve A.35 and the definition of marginal cost
defined previously:
m˜crt = mct + µt
. The log-linearized marginal cost 3.43 can be written in the following way:
mct = wt − pt,H − at (A.50)
mct = (wt − pt) + (pt − pt,H)− at
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Plugging the relationship between marginal utility and real wage derived in 3.39 and the
definition of domestic prices as a function of the terms of trade A.38, the equation above holds
as:
mct = (−v + ηnt + ρct) + (1− v)tott − at
mct = −v + ρct + ηnt + (1− v)tott − at (A.51)
Taking into account the world market equilibrium A.47, the log-linearized production function
and the relationship between domestic consumption and terms of trade A.44:
mct = −v + ρ(c
∗
t +
vtott
ρ
) + ηnt + (1− v)tott − at
mct = −v + ρ(y
∗
t − g
∗
t ) + vtott + η(yt − at) + (1− v)tott − at
mct = −v + ρ(y
∗
t − g
∗
t ) + tott + ηyt − at(η + 1) (A.52)
Finally, isolating tott from equation A.48: tott = (yt − gt)ρv − (y
∗
t − g
∗
t )ρv and plugging it in
the equation derived above, the marginal cost as a function of domestic and foreign variables
is the following:
mct = −v + ρ(y
∗
t − g
∗
t ) + tott + ηyt − at(η + 1)
mct = −v + ρ(y
∗
t − g
∗
t ) + (yt − gt)ρv − (y
∗
t − g
∗
t )ρv + ηyt − at(η + 1)
mct = −v + c
∗
t (ρ− ρv) + yt(η + ρv)− gtρv − at(η + 1) (A.53)
A.13 The natural output
A.53 is written as:
− µnt = −v + y
n
t (η + ρv) + c
∗
t (ρ− ρv)− gtρv − at(η + 1) (A.54)
Isolating the natural output, the following expression holds:
ynt = Γo + Γµµ
n
t + Γ∗c
∗
t + Γggt + Γaat (A.55)
Γo =
v
η + ρv
; Γµ = −
1
η + ρv
; Γ∗ = −
ρ− ρv
η + ρv
; Γg =
ρv
η + ρv
; Γa =
η + 1
η + ρv
A.14 The Efficient output
The efficient output yet prevails in the absence of real and nominal rigidities. Consequently,
equation A.53 is written in the following way:
− µ = −v + yet (η + ρv)− gtρv + c
∗
t (ρ− ρv)− at(η + 1) (A.56)
Isolating yet , the efficient output is:
yet = Γo + Γ∗c
∗
t + Γggt + Γaat (A.57)
Γo =
−µ+ v
η + ρv
; Γ∗ = −
ρ− ρv
η + ρv
; Γg =
ρv
η + ρv
; Γa =
η + 1
η + ρv
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A.15 The New Keynesian Phillips curve
An alternative version of the Phillips curve derived in the previous section as a function of
the marginal cost and the markup relies on the definition of the output gap y˜t:
y˜t = yt − y
n
t (A.58)
Subtracting equation A.54 from A.53, the marginal cost m˜ct as a function of the output gap
with respect to the natural output is the following:
mct + µ
n
t = (ρ− ρv)(y
∗
t − g
∗
t ) + yt(η + ρv)− gtρv − at(η + 1)
−ytn(η + ρv)− (ρ− ρv)(y
∗
t − g
∗
t ) + gtρv + at(η + 1)
m˜ct = y˜t(η + ρv) (A.59)
However, in order to obtain an expression for the New Keynesian curve defined previously, one
should obtain the marginal cost as a function of the efficient output gap: mˆc = mct −mc
e
t =
mct + µ. In this case, the relevant output gap is defined as the difference between the actual
output and the efficient one:
xt = yt − y
e
t (A.60)
Therefore, subtracting equation A.56 from A.53, and taking into account equation A.60:
mˆcrt = (η + ρv)(yt − y
e
t )
mˆcrt = (η + ρv)(xt) (A.61)
Now, just remain the specification of the markup µt = µ
n
t − µ, which can be obtained as the
difference between equation A.54 and A.56:
µt = µ
n
t − µ = (η + ρv)(y
e
t − y
n
t ) (A.62)
Lastly, inserting equation A.61 and A.62 into the domestic Phillips curve already derived A.35:
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζ(mˆct
r) + ζ(µt)
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + ζ(η + ρv)xt + ζ(η + ρv)µt
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + κvxt + κvµt (A.63)
where ζ = (1−αβ)(1−α)
α
and κv = ζ(η + ρv).
A.16 The Dynamic IS equation
In order to derive the dynamic version of the IS equation, the definition of the real interest
rate rrt according to the Fisher rule is:
rt = it − Et(πt+1) (A.64)
Secondly, in order to derive an expression of the output gap as a function of the natural
interest rate, I follow five additional steps:
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• Recalling the definition of inflation as a function of terms of trade A.39, an alternative
representation of equation A.49 is:
yt = yt+1−
(1− λ)(it − πt+1,H − (1− v)∆tott+1 − γ)
ρ
−λ∆y∗t+1+λ∆g
∗
t+1−vγ∆tott+1−∆gt+1
yt = yt+1−
(1− λ)(it − πt+1,H − γ)
ρ
−λ∆y∗t+1+λ∆g
∗
t+1−∆gt+1+∆tott+1(
(1− λ)(1− v)
ρ
−vγ)
yt = yt+1−
(1− λ)(it − πt+1,H − γ)
ρ
−λ∆y∗t+1+λ∆g
∗
t+1−∆gt+1+∆
∆tott+1
ρ
((1−λ)(1−v)−vγρ)
yt = yt+1 −
(1− λ)(it − πt+1,H − γ)
ρ
− λ∆y∗t+1 + λ∆g
∗
t+1 −∆gt+1 −
∆tott+1
ρ
ω (A.65)
Where ω = vγρ− (1− λ)(1− v)
• Now, isolating the terms of trade tott from equation A.48 (tott = ρv(yt − y
∗
t + g
∗
t − gt))
and plugging it in the just derived equation A.65, the domestic demand as a function of
foreign output, government spending, interest rate and expected domestic inflation is
written as:
→ yt = yt+1 −
(1− λ)
ρ
(it − πt+1,H − γ)− λ∆y
∗
t+1 + λ∆g
∗
t+1 −∆gt+1
−
ωρv
ρ
((yt+1 − y
∗
t+1 + g
∗
t+1 − gt+1)− (yt − y
∗
t + g
∗
t − gt))
→ yt(1−
ωρv
ρ
)− gt(1−
ωρv
ρ
) = (yt+1 − gt+1)(1−
ωρv
ρ
)
−
(1− λ)
ρ
(it − πt+1,H − γ) + (∆y
∗
t+1 −∆g
∗
t+1)(
ωρv
ρ
− λ)
The term ρ(1− ωρv
ρ
) can be written as ρv(1− λ), thus, the previous equation holds as:
yt − gt = yt+1 − gt+1 −
1
ρv
(it − πt+1,H − γ) + (∆y
∗
t+1 −∆g
∗
t+1)(
ωρv − λρ
ρv(1− λ)
) (A.66)
→ yt − gt = yt+1 − gt+1 −
1
ρv
(it − πt+1,H − γ) + ωρ∆c
∗
t+1
where ωρ =
ωρv−λρ
ρv(1−λ)
• Using the expression of the real interest rate A.64 in A.66, the domestic demand can be
written as:
yt − gt = yt+1 − gt+1 −
(rt − γ)
ρv
+ (∆y∗t+1 −∆g
∗
t+1)(
ωρv − λρ
ρv(1− λ)
)
• Knowing that the efficient output is a function of the efficient real interest rate:
yet − gt = y
e
t+1 − gt+1 −
(rnt − γ)
ρv
+ (∆y∗t+1 −∆g
∗
t+1)(
ωρv − λρ
ρv(1− λ)
) (A.67)
• Finally, the dynamic IS equation emerges by subtracting equation A.67 from A.66
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→ yt − gt − y
e
t + gt = yt+1 − gt+1 −
1
ρv
(it − πt+1,H − γ) + (∆y
∗
t+1 −∆g
∗
t+1)(
ωρv − λρ
ρv(1− λ)
)
−yet+1 + gt+1 +
(ret − γ)
ρv
− (∆y∗t+1 −∆g
∗
t+1)(
ωρv − λρ
ρv(1− λ)
)
→ xt = xt+1 −
1
ρv
(it − r
e
t − πt+1,H) (A.68)
A.17 The efficient interest rate
Equation A.66, A.57 and A.68 can be written respectively as:
∆yt+1 −∆gt+1 =
1
ρv
(it − πt+1,H − γ)− ωρ∆c
∗
t+1 (A.69)
∆yet+1 = Γg∆gt+1 + Γ∗∆c
∗
t+1 + Γa∆at+1 (A.70)
∆xt+1 =
1
ρv
(it − r
e
t − πt+1,H) (A.71)
Isolating the efficient real interest rate from equation A.71 and using the definition of the
relevant output gap xt = yt − y
e
t :
ret = (it − πt+1,H)− ρv(∆yt+1 −∆y
e
t+1)
Consequently, plugging A.69 and A.70 in the equation above, the efficient interest rate is the
following:
→ ret = (it − πt+1,H)− ρv((∆gt+1 +
1
ρv
(it − πt+1,H − γ)− ωρ∆c
∗
t+1
−(Γ∗(∆c
∗
t+1) + Γg∆gt+1 + Γa∆at+1))
→ ret = γ − ρv∆gt+1 + ρv∆c
∗
t+1(ωρ + Γ∗) + ρvΓg∆gt+1 + ρvΓa(ρaat − at)
Simplifying:
ret = γ + ρv∆c
∗
t+1(ωρ + Γ∗) + ρvΓg∆gt+1 + ρvΓa(ρaat − at) (A.72)
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Appendix B
Deseasonalized Data
Source: Institute of National Statistics - Bolivia and author’s computation.
Figure B.1: Original and seasonal adjustment ARIMA X-13: Gross Domestic Product -
Constant USD - Quarterly data
Figure B.2: Original and seasonal adjustment ARIMA X-13: Private Consumtpion - Constant
USD - Quarterly data
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Figure B.3: Original and seasonal adjustment ARIMA X-13: Governement Spending - Constant
USD - Quarterly data
Figure B.4: Original and seasonal adjustment ARIMA X-13: Exports - Constant USD -
Quarterly data
Figure B.5: Original and seasonal adjustment ARIMA X-13: Imports - Constant USD -
Quarterly data
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Appendix C
Bayessian estimation - Baseline model
Figure C.1: Prior and Posterior distributions
Figure C.2: Multivariate convergence diagnostic
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Appendix D
Baseline model - Impulse response func-
tions
D.1 Welfare under PPI,CPI and PEG
The least preferred policy is marked in red color.
Taylor Rule (PPI) PEG
φpi 1.5 1.5 5 1.5 -
φy 0.125 0 0 1 -
Productivity 0.0123007 0.0129827 0.0045509 0.0089328 0.0430188
Ext.demand 0.0098652 0.0098918 0.0094063 0.0097231 0.1334600
Gov.spending 0.0142477 0.0143604 0.0127876 0.0136479 0.0171980
Cost-push 0.0281007 0.0301173 0.0384760 0.0183349 0.0164681
Welfare loss 0.00645142 0.00673521 0.00652207 0.00506387 0.021014
-
Assumption: ρ = 1
-φpi and φy are parameters corresponding to the Taylor rule
Taylor Rule (CPI) PEG
φpi 1.5 1.5 5 1.5 -
φy 0.125 0 0 1 -
Welfare losses under each type of shock
Productivity 0.002204 0.002319 0.001786 0.001619 0.004301
Ext. demand 0.003308 0.003432 0.004120 0.002664 0.013346
Gov.spending 0.001533 0.001547 0.001477 0.001457 0.001719
Cost-push 0.002267 0.002408 0.002709 0.001550 0.001646
Welfare loss 0.009313 0.009708 0.010094 0.007292 0.021014
-
Assumption: ρ = 1
-φpi and φy are parameters corresponding to the Taylor rule
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D.2 Inflation targeting (CPI and PPI) and peg
Figure D.1: Inflation targeting (CPI) - Productivity shock
Figure D.2: Inflation targeting (CPI)- Government Spending Shock
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Figure D.3: Inflation targeting (CPI)- Foreign Demand Shock
Figure D.4: Inflation targeting (CPI) - Markup Shock
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Figure D.5: Nominal exchange rate peg - Productivity shock
Figure D.6: Nominal exchange rate peg - Government Spending Shock
69
APPENDIX D. BASELINE MODEL - IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
Figure D.7: Nominal exchange rate peg - Foreign Demand Shock
Figure D.8: Nominal exchange rate peg - Markup Shock
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Figure D.9: Taylor (PPI) - Markup Shock
Figure D.10: Taylor (PPI) - Government Spending Shock
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Figure D.11: Taylor (PPI) - Productivity Shock
Figure D.12: Taylor (PPI) - Foreign Demand Shock
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Appendix E
Welfare analysis
E.1 Welfare function in terms of consumption and la-
bor
The main assumption for the derivation of a tractable welfare function in terms of con-
sumption and labor is that the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution
are equal to one. (i.e. θ = ρ =1). According to the definition of the second-order Taylor
expansion, the utility function is written in the following way:
Ut − U = UcC
Ct − C
C
+ UnN
Nt −N
N
+
1
2
UccC
2(
Ct − C
C
)2 +
1
2
UnnN
2(
Nt −N
N
)2 (E.1)
Using the fact that: Xt−X
X
= xt +
1
2
x2t , the equation above holds as:
Ut − U = UcC(cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t ) + UnN(nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t ) +
1
2
UccC
2cˆ2t +
1
2
UnnN
2nˆ2t + (||o||
3)
where (||o||3) considers terms higher than second order. Distributing:
Ut − U
UcC
= cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t
(
1 +
UccC
Uc
)
+
UnN
UcC
(
nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t
(
1 +
UnnN
Un
))
(E.2)
According to the functional form of utility, and the assumption of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution equal to the unity:
UccC
Uc
= −1 and
UnnN
Un
= η (E.3)
Plugging E.3 in E.2 and simplifying:
Ut − U
UcC
= cˆt +
UnN
UcC
(
nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t (1 + η)
)
(E.4)
Thus, writing the previous equation as an infinite sum, the welfare function in terms of
consumption and labor is:
Wt =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct − (1− λ)nˆt −
(1− λ)(1 + η)
2
nˆ2t
)
(E.5)
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E.2 The Central Bank loss function
The main assumption for the derivation of the central bank loss function in terms of output
gap and inflation is that the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution are
equal to one (i.e. θ = ρ =1) which implies that the analysis is analogous to the closed economy
case.
According to the definition of the second-order Taylor expansion, the utility function is
written in the following way:
Ut − U = UcC
Ct − C
C
+ UnN
Nt −N
N
+
1
2
UccC
2(
Ct − C
C
)2 +
1
2
UnnN
2(
Nt −N
N
)2
Using the fact that: Xt−X
X
= xt +
1
2
x2t , the equation above holds as:
Ut − U = UcC(cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t ) + UnN(nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t ) +
1
2
UccC
2cˆ2t +
1
2
UnnN
2nˆ2t + (||o||
3)
where (||o||3) considers terms higher than second order. Distributing terms:
Ut − U
UcC
= cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t
(
1 +
UccC
Uc
)
+
UnN
UcC
(
nˆt +
1
2
nˆ2t
(
1 +
UnnN
Un
))
(E.6)
Taking into account the relationship between domestic and foreign output given by equation
A.48 and isolating the terms of trade:
tott = ρv(yt − gt)− ρvc
∗
t (E.7)
Plugging E.7 in the the risk sharing condition given by A.44:
ct = c
∗
t +
(1− λ)ρv
ρ
yt +
(1− λ)
ρ
ρv(g
∗
t − y
∗
t − gt) (E.8)
Also, note that according to the functional form of utility and the assumption of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to the unity:
UccC
Uc
= −1 and
UnnN
Un
= η (E.9)
Plugging E.8 into E.6 and taking into account equation E.9:
Ut− U
UcC
=
(1− λ)ρv
ρ
yt +
UnN
UcC
(nˆt +
(1 + η)
2
n2t ) + t.i.p. (E.10)
where t.i.p accounts for terms independent of policy. Further, from the utility function, the
aggregate labor is written as: ∫ n
0
N(z)dz =
∫ n
0
y(z)
At
Plugging the aggregate demand given by equation A.16:
∫ n
0
(
p(z)
PH
)
−σ
Yt,H
At
d(z)
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Where Yt,H =
((
PH
P
)
−θ
(
(1− λ)C + λC∗
(
1
Q
)
−θ
)
+G
)
. Organizing terms, the following
log-linear representation yields:
nt = yt,H − at + ln(
∫ n
0
(
p(z)
PH
)
−σ
d(z))
nt = yt,H − at + dt (E.11)
Following Gali (2015), the term dt is written as:
dt =
σ
2
vari(pt,H) (E.12)
Finally, plugging equation E.11 and E.12 in E.10:
Ut− U
UcC
=
(1− λ)ρv
ρ
yt +
UnN
UcC
(yˆt +
σ
2
vari(pt,H) +
(1 + η)
2
(yˆt − aˆt)
2) + t.i.p.+ (||o||3) (E.13)
As shown previously, the maximization problem of the social planner yields:−Un
Uc
= (1− λ)C
N
(Derivation of this relationship in section E.2.1) (Equation E.27), therefore equation E.13
simplifies as follows:
Ut− U
UcC
= (1− λ)ρvyt− (1− λ)(yˆt +
σ
2
vari(pt,H) +
(1 + η)
2
(yˆt
2 − 2yˆtaˆt + a
2
t )) + t.i.p.+ (||o||
3)
Reorganizing terms and factorizing:
Ut− U
UcC
= (1− λ)ρvyt −
(1− λ)
2
(yˆt + σvari(pt,H) + (1 + η)(yˆt
2 − 2yˆtaˆt)) + t.i.p.+ (||o||
3)
Recalling the definition of the efficient output gap: xˆt = yˆt − yˆ
e
t :
Ut− U
UcC
= (1− λ)(ρv − 1)xˆt +−
(1− λ)
2
(σvari(pt,H) + (1 + η)(yˆt
2 − 2yˆtaˆt)) + t.i.p.+ (||o||
3)
Using the expression of the efficient output as a function of productivity, simplifying and
factorizing:
Ut− U
UcC
= (1−λ)(ρv−1)xˆt−
(1− λ)
2
(σvari(pt,H)+(1+η)(yˆt
2−2yˆtyˆ
e
t+yˆ
e
t
2−yˆet
2))+t.i.p.+(||o||3)
Ut− U
UcC
= (1−λ)(ρv − 1)xˆt−
(1− λ)
2
(σvari(pt,H)+ (1+ η)((yˆt− yˆ
e
t )
2− yˆet
2))+ t.i.p.+(||o||3)
Ut− U
UcC
= (1− λ)(ρv − 1)xˆt −
(1− λ)
2
(σvari(pt,H) + (1 + η)xˆ
2
t ) + t.i.p.+ (||o||
3) (E.14)
Following Woodford (2003), the next equality holds:
∞∑
t=0
βtvari(pt, H) =
α
(1− α)(1− βα)
∞∑
t=0
βtπ2t = ζ
−1
∞∑
t=0
βtπ2t
Where the coefficients corresponding to ζ match exactly to those in the Phillips curve’s
equation derived previously. Hence, writing equation E.14 as an infinite sum and factorizing:
∞∑
t=0
βt
Ut− U
UcC
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1− λ)(ρv − 1)xˆt −
(1− λ)
2
(σζ−1π2t + (1 + η)xˆ
2
t ) + t.i.p.+ (||o||
3)
)
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∞∑
t=0
βt
Ut− U
UcC
= −(1− λ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1− ρv)xˆt +
1
2
(σζ−1π2t + (1 + η)xˆ
2
t ) + t.i.p.+ (||o||
3)
)
Finally, when the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution are equal to one,
the term ρv = 1, and the welfare loss function is written as:
W = −(1− λ)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
2
(σζ−1π2t + (1 + η)xˆ
2
t )
)
(E.15)
E.2.1 The social planner problem
The optimization problem of the social planner seeks to maximize the utility subject to
the production function and the aggregate demand:
maximize
Ct,Nt
Et(
∞∑
0
U(Ct, Nt)) subject to Yt = AtNt ; Yt =
(
PH
P
)−1
((1− λ)Ct + λC
∗
tQ)
It is useful to transform the above equations, such that the maximization problem is focused
only in Nt. To do that, I follow some additional steps, taking into account that θ = ρ =1:
• The risk sharing condition (equation 3.60) is rewritten as:
Tott =
(
Ct
C∗t
) 1
1−λ
(E.16)
• In particular, when θ = 1 and the size of the economy tends to zero, the price index
(equation 3.10) holds as:
Pt = P
1−λ
H,t P
λ
F,t (E.17)
which divided by PH,t and PF,t gives respectively:
→
Pt
PH,t
=
(
PF,t
PH,t
)λ
→
Pt
PH,t
= Totλt (E.18)
→
Pt
PF,t
=
(
1
Tott
)1−λ
→
PF,t
Pt
= Tot1−λt (E.19)
• Using equations 3.50 (PF,t = StP
∗
F,t) and 3.51 (P
∗ = P ∗F ), the real exchange rate is
written as:
Qt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
=
StP
∗
F,t
Pt
=
StPF,t
StPt
Qt =
PF,t
Pt
(E.20)
Equalizing equation E.20 and E.19, the following equality holds:
Qt = Tot
1−λ
t (E.21)
• Plugging equations E.18 and E.21 in the demand function stated above and distributing
terms:
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Yt =
(
PH
P
)−1
((1− λ)Ct + λC
∗
tQ)
Yt = Tot
λ
t ((1− λ)Ct + λC
∗
t Tot
1−λ
t )
Yt = (1− λ)Tot
λ
tCt + λTottC
∗
t (E.22)
• Plugging equation E.16 in E.22 and simplifying:
Ct = Y
1−λ
t C
∗λ
t (E.23)
• Finally, inserting the production function in equation E.23:
Ct = (AtNt)
1−λC∗λt (E.24)
• Using equation E.24, the period optimization problem of the social planner is:
maximize
Ct,Nt
Et(
∞∑
0
U(Ct, Nt)) → Et(
∞∑
0
U((AtNt)
1−λC∗λt , Nt))
F.O.C wrt Nt → Ut,C((1− λ)AtN
−λ
t C
∗λ
t + Ut,N = 0 (E.25)
Note that equation E.24 can be written as AtN
−λ
t C
∗λ
t =
Ct
Nt
: , thus, equation E.25 is:
Ut,C(1− λ)
Ct
Nt
+ Ut,N = 0
→ −
Ut,N
Ut,C
= (1− λ)
Ct
Nt
(E.26)
• At the steady state, equation E.26 holds as:
→ −
UN
UC
= (1− λ)
C
N
(E.27)
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Appendix F
Application of the Baseline model
F.1 Profits of the oil sector
The profit maximization problem is written as:
ΠOt =
1
n
∫ n
0
p(z)yO(z)−NOt W
O
t
Knowing that: yO(z) =
(
p(z)
POt
)
−σ
Y Ot and P
O
t =
(
1
n
∫ n
0 (pt(z))
1−σdz
) 1
1−σ , the following equality
holds:
1
n
∫ n
0
p(z)yO(z) =
1
n
∫ n
0
p(z)
(
p(z)
POt
)
−σ
Y Ot =
1
n
∫ n
0
(p(z))1−σ
Y Ot
(POt )−σ
= (POt )
1−σ Y
O
t
(POt )−σ
→
1
n
∫ n
0
p(z)yO(z) = POt Y
O
t
Thus, the profit maximization problem is:
ΠOt = P
O
t Y
O
t −N
O
t W
O
t (F.1)
Using the production function, the equation above can be written as:
ΠOt = P
O
t A
O
t (N
O
t )
k −NOt W
O
t
First order conditions with respect to labor:
POt A
O
t k(N
O
t )
k−1 = WOt
→ Wt =
POt A
O
t k
(NOt )1−k
(F.2)
Replacing equation F.2 in F.1, yields:
ΠOt = P
O
t Y
O
t − P
O
t A
O
t (N
O
t )
kk
ΠOt = P
O
t Y
O
t (1− k) (F.3)
F.2 Welfare losses
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Table F.1: Welfare Losses - Evaluation of simple monetary policy rules in the presence of
commodity price shocks, productivity shocks (commodity and non-commodity sectors) and
foreign demand shock
PEG Taylor Rule (CPI)
Non-commodity sector
productivity shock
0.000697575723672130834575496 0.000697575723672126070015167
Commodity sector pro-
ductivity shock
0.045102498413471996206031145 0.045102498413471752260542336
Commodity price
shock
0.034668429708940014884101938 0.034668429708939655742132302
Foreign demand shock 0.001355384925110290918578082 0.001355384925110269530996164
Cost-push shock 0.000155595208925536038328141 0.000155595208925535614811667
Government spending
shock
0.000385203521161498050274163 0.000385203521161496144450031
Welfare loss 0.083765410254551232412979778 0.083765410254551151097816841
-Assumption: ρ = 1
-The Taylor rule considered in this case is it = ρr ∗ it−1 + (1− ρr) ∗ (ψy ∗ y + ψpi ∗ pi), where
ρr = 0.7, ψy = 0.5 and ψpi = 1.5 (Similar to the baseline model)
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Appendix G
Bayessian estimation - Commodity shocks
Figure G.1: Prior and Posterior distributions
Figure G.2: Multivariate convergence diagnostic
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Appendix H
Commodity sector - Impulse response
functions
Figure H.1: Commodity price shock (1)
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Figure H.2: Commodity price shock (2)
Figure H.3: Productivity shock in the commodity sector (1)
82
APPENDIX H. COMMODITY SECTOR - IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
Figure H.4: Productivity shock in the commodity sector (2)
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